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1. Introduction	
1.1. Background	
 “Entrepreneurship is an important and, until fairly recently, sadly neglected 
subject.” (Casson, 1990) 
As the citation above implies, entrepreneurship as a concept did not receive for many 
years the attention that it definitely would have deserved. However, the situation has 
now changed, and entrepreneurship has gained significant attention since the mid-
1970s. Not only has entrepreneurship become a symbolic status for freedom and 
prestige but it has become also an important topic in economic policy agendas and in 
academic literature. The reason for this is clear; entrepreneurship has emerged as the 
driving force for economic development and employment growth across countries 
(Audretsch & Thurik, 2004; Kanniainen & Poutvaara, 2007).  
The mid-1970s marks the turning point after which the economic structural 
transformation and growth have been mainly driven by the creation of start-ups 
instead of existing firms. Research efforts have shown that start-up firms are the 
most likely ones to grow and to create new jobs. (Naudé, 2008) Nowadays, it is well 
known that the contribution of young and small firms to net employment and 
productivity growth is disproportionately high (Henrekson et al., 2010). In fact, 
entrepreneurship may affect economic growth in various ways. For example, 
entrepreneurs may introduce important innovations in terms of new products or 
production processes, play vital roles in the early evolution of industries, increase 
productivity by increasing competition, or speed up the discovery of the dominant 
design for specific product-markets (van Stel et al., 2007). 
Consequently, many governments especially in Europe have had high hopes that 
entrepreneurship could be the solution to weak economic performance and 
employment problem (Henrekson, 2007). Similarly, many institutions such as the 
European Commission (EC), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), and the World Bank have all emphasized the importance of 
fostering entrepreneurship (Bosma, 2009). As a response, different research fields 
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have started contributing intensively to understanding the phenomenon (Henrekson, 
2007).    
However, entrepreneurial activity varies systematically both across countries and 
over time (Kanniainen & Vesala, 2005). For example, Figure 1 shows the rate of 
early-stage entrepreneurial activity in different European countries (Bosma, 2009). 
Clearly, there are significant differences in entrepreneurial activity across countries 
and regions. 
 
Figure 1: Early-stage entrepreneurial activity in some European countries (Bosma, 2009) 
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Blanchflower (2000) explains that these variances across countries and over time are 
considered to be due to differences in levels of economic development, and in 
demographic, cultural and institutional characteristics. For example, Figure 2 
illustrates how entrepreneurial activity depends on the level of economic 
development (Wennekers et al., 2005). The figure implies a U-shaped relationship 
between entrepreneurial activity and economic development. However, in spite of 
these observations and few explanations, economic theory has not fully explained 
why such a variation in the rate of entrepreneurship arises, and how it is related to 
economic structures and national economic policies (Ilmakunnas & Kanniainen, 
2001).  
 
Figure 2: Entrepreneurial activity and economic development, 2002 (Wennekers et al., 2005) 
One such a consideration that is definitely worth understanding is the relationship 
between entrepreneurial activity and labor market structure, and how different labor 
market policies affect the incentives of individuals to become entrepreneurs. 
Considering the employment problem for example in many European countries, and 
to be able to develop policies that would foster employment growth, it is important to 
understand the connection between entrepreneurship and labor market structures.  
Not only affect current labor market conditions new firm formation but the rate of 
entrepreneurship is likely to affect labor market performances as well (Torrini, 
2005). For example, when an individual considers becoming an entrepreneur, and 
plans to establish a new firm, he or she must evaluate the prevailing economic 
environment. This includes also the nature of labor markets. On the one hand, it may 
be that poor employment situation actually forces an individual to establish a firm, 
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i.e. to become self-employed. On the other hand, the prevailing labor market 
characteristics may influence the ability of the new firm to operate and grow.  
It is now clear that understanding the connection between entrepreneurship and labor 
market structures is pivotal for developing policies that would foster employment 
growth. However, the extent of labor market regulations varies greatly across 
countries (Venn, 2009). There are also different kinds of regulative tools available 
such as taxation, labor unions, unemployment benefit systems, and employment 
protection legislation (EPL). Other regulative labor market institutions include 
measures such as minimum wages, retirement issues, family allowances, regulation 
on working hours, and policies on immigration and education. (Boeri & van Ours, 
2008) 
However, relatively little is known of the impact of labor market institutions on 
entrepreneurship or new firm formation (Kanniainen & Vesala, 2005). More 
specifically, even less is known of the impact of labor unions on new firm formation. 
By taking a look at Figure 3 (Pekkarinen, 2013), it is clear that labor unions are a 
very significant labor market characteristic especially in Ghent-countries such as 
Sweden, Finland and Denmark, where labor unions are also involved in the 
unemployment benefit system.  
 
Figure 3: Labor union density in OECD countries in 2006 (Pekkarinen, 2013) 
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Considering the fact that unions are very important actors especially in Ghent 
countries such as Finland, which also suffers from relatively high unemployment 
rates, this connection is definitely worth understanding. Labor unions do not have an 
effect only through wage-setting but also through other labor market institutions as 
well, such as unemployment benefits and EPL. Clearly, the effect of labor unions on 
entrepreneurship bears a high significance both in economic policy discussions but 
also in academic literature. 
Above discussion has introduced the two interconnected themes of this thesis; 
entrepreneurship and labor market institutions, or more specifically labor unions. It 
can be concluded that although entrepreneurship and labor market regulation are 
important issues in economic policy agendas, the connection especially between 
labor unions and new firm formation remains unclear in the economic academic 
literature. This thesis aims to contribute to filling this research gap by discussing the 
mechanism through which labor unions affect new firm formation, and by studying 
whether existing empirical literature provides any support for the proposed effects.       
1.2. Research	problem	
This section presents the research problem of this thesis. Based on the discussion in 
the previous section, the aim of this thesis is to understand how labor unions affect 
the rate of entrepreneurship, either directly or indirectly. On the one hand, labor 
unions may affect entrepreneurship directly through wage bargaining process. On the 
other hand, and because labor unions interact with other labor market institutions as 
well, labor unions may affect entrepreneurship also indirectly through other 
regulative measures. The effect of unemployment benefits and employment 
protection legislation on entrepreneurship is especially worth understanding. These 
two regulative tools can be considered to have a relatively big impact on 
entrepreneurship as they influence directly individuals’ incentives to start an 
entrepreneurial career or firms’ capability and willingness to grow and hire. 
Therefore, the research problem of this thesis can be formulated as follows: 
 How do labor unions affect the rate of entrepreneurship either through wage-
bargaining process, or through unemployment benefits and employment 
protection legislation?  
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1.3. Objectives	
In order to address the research question, the following objectives must be achieved. 
First of all, a theoretical analysis framework must be presented that integrates 
relevant theories and frameworks of the existing entrepreneurial economic literature. 
This helps to understand the setting where an individual makes his or her 
occupational choice to become an entrepreneur. Second, an economic model must be 
presented that reflects the mechanism through which labor unions, including 
unemployment benefits and employment protection legislation that they tend to 
promote, affect the decision making process of an individual to become either an 
entrepreneur or an employee in an existing firm. Third, the proposed implications of 
the model must be assessed by studying existing entrepreneurial economic literature. 
Finally, in order to answer the research question, the results must be analyzed and 
discussed. Therefore, the objectives of this thesis can be stated as follows: 
 To present a theoretical analysis framework that reflects the setting where an 
individual makes his or her occupational choice.  
 To present an economic model that captures the mechanism through which 
labor unions, including unemployment benefits and employment protection 
legislation, affect the occupational choice of an individual.  
 To evaluate whether empirical literature supports the hypotheses proposed by 
the chosen model. 
 To draw conclusions how labor unions affect the rate of entrepreneurship. 
1.4. Scope	
This thesis focuses on the question of how labor unions affect entrepreneurship either 
through wage bargaining, or through other specific labor market institutions that they 
tend to support; i.e. unemployment benefits and employment protection legislation. 
Therefore, this study does not consider other types of labor market regulation. 
Furthermore, the idea is to study the mechanism through which an individual makes 
an occupational choice to become an entrepreneur instead of being an employee. 
Therefore, as this thesis analyzes the decision-making process of individuals, the 
analysis is conducted at the micro-level. Moreover, although the term “new firm 
formation” is often used in this thesis, it refers explicitly to the situation where an 
individual establishes a new organization, works on his or her own account, and is 
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willing to employ other people as the firm grows. Therefore, this thesis excludes 
intrapreneurship, spin-offs and other possible forms of new firm formation.  
As noted by Verheul et al. (2002), there are several aspects of entrepreneurship that 
could be considered such as gender, ethnicity, part-time entrepreneurship as a 
primary occupation and having a side-business as a secondary work activity, and 
unpaid family workers. None of these aspects are considered in this thesis. 
It is also good to notice that the argument of more entrepreneurs is always better is 
not necessarily true (Baumol, 1990; Douhan & Henrekson, 2007; Henrekson, 2007). 
Although an interesting theme, this thesis does not consider the possible effects of 
labor unions on the optimal amount of entrepreneurs nor on the composition or 
quality of entrepreneurs.  
1.5. Structure	of	the	thesis	
In this section, the structure of the thesis is presented and the underlying logic is 
explained. First of all, the chapter two presents the overall theoretical background of 
this thesis. The first section of the chapter two introduces the main concepts of this 
thesis, namely entrepreneurship and labor unions, and discusses them relatively 
thoroughly. The purpose is not only to define and understand the concepts but also to 
discuss how this thesis fits in the existing entrepreneurial economics. Based on the 
first section, the second section presents a theoretical analysis framework that 
integrates many relevant ideas and theories from the existing entrepreneurial 
economics. The purpose is to understand the setting where an individual makes his or 
her occupational choice to become an entrepreneur. Whereas the third section 
presents the occupational choice models in general, the fourth section presents the 
main economic model of this thesis; the occupational choice model in a unionized 
economy. In the fourth section, it is also discussed about possible limitations of the 
presented model.  Finally, the section five formulates the hypotheses of this thesis 
based on the chosen model. 
In the chapter three, the empirical evidence is reviewed. Because entrepreneurship is 
difficult to define and measure, as it will be explained especially in the chapter two, a 
strong emphasis is given on assessing the reliability and validity of data used in 
different studies and thus results observed.  Furthermore, the results are analyzed, 
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and the tenability of the formulated hypotheses is evaluated. These conclusions and 
their implications are discussed more thoroughly in the chapter four. Finally, the 
chapter five summarizes the aim of this thesis and the main findings. It is also 
discussed about the limitations of this thesis as well as implications for future 
research and policy discussions. 
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2. Theoretical	background	
In this chapter, the theoretical background of this thesis is presented. In the first 
section, it is discussed first about entrepreneurship as a concept and as a research 
field, and thereafter also about labor market institutions with focus on labor unions. 
Thus, the first section aims to present and define relevant concepts for this thesis as 
well as to discuss how this thesis fits in the existing entrepreneurial research. The 
second section presents a theoretical framework which incorporates many important 
aspects of entrepreneurship identified in the earlier literature, and which particularly 
presents the setting where potential entrepreneurs make their occupational choice. 
The third section presents the general idea of occupational choice models, and the 
fourth section presents the main theoretical model used in this thesis; the 
occupational choice model in a unionized economy. Finally, the fifth section 
summarizes the hypotheses of this thesis. 
2.1. Introducing	the	main	concepts	of	this	thesis	
2.1.1. Entrepreneurship	and	entrepreneurial	economics	
Entrepreneurship is anything but a simple concept, and it does not really have a 
commonly agreed definition (e.g. Henrekson, 2007; Kanniainen, 2006; Ma & Tan, 
2006; Naudé, 2008; Verheul et al., 2002). The reason for this is the fact that 
entrepreneurship can be approached in many different ways: not only is the 
phenomenon studied almost in all disciplines but also the areas of focus are equally 
diverse, ranging from issues such as personality and motivation to finance and policy 
(Henrekson, 2007). Therefore, and as Verheul et al. (2002) put it; “entrepreneurship 
is a multidimensional concept, the definition of which depends largely on the focus of 
the research undertaken”.  
As implied in the paragraph above, economics is not the sole contributor for 
understanding the complexity of entrepreneurship. Swedberg (2000) emphasizes the 
contributions made by social sciences other than economics. He highlights especially 
the fields of sociology, psychology, anthropology and economic history, where the 
work is much more descriptive, and the theoretical part is more directly influenced 
by the empirical research. Whereas psychology studies have often focused on 
motives and entrepreneurial traits, sociological studies have focused on the 
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background of entrepreneurs (Verheul et al., 2002). Also the contributions of 
strategic management literature and organizational theory research are considerable 
(Lahti, 1986; Davidsson, 1989). Based on the discussion above, and also according 
to Kanniainen (2006), it is clear that the effort of all research disciplines is needed to 
capture the complex nature of entrepreneurship. However, in order to understand 
entrepreneurship and its role in economic literature, and to derive a sufficient 
definition for an entrepreneur for this thesis, the field of entrepreneurial economics 
must be first understood.  
According to Ricketts (2006), entrepreneur is considered in modern common usage 
as a person “who undertakes an enterprise, especially a commercial one, often at 
personal financial risk”. This “modern” idea of entrepreneur emerged not until the 
eighteenth century during the time of agricultural and industrial revolutions and the 
birth of classical political economy. (Ricketts, 2006) Richard Cantillon (1680-1734) 
was the first economist to write about entrepreneur (Wennekers & Thurik, 1999; 
Kanniainen, 2006). Cantillon recognized three classes of economic agents; 
landowners, entrepreneurs and employees, and where an entrepreneur is someone 
who engages in business in the face of uncertainty (Wennekers & Thurik, 1999). 
Whereas Cantillon saw entrepreneur as an arbitrator, another early influential writer, 
Jean-Baptiste Say (1767-1832), considered entrepreneur as a coordinator of 
production process (Kanniainen, 2006), or more specifically as an agent combining 
land, labour and capital (Lahti, 1986).  
Nevertheless, neither classical nor neo-classical economics have found it easy to 
integrate entrepreneur into theoretical formulations. It is important to notice here that 
an entrepreneur’s profit is actually a residual that remains after all contractual 
commitments (Ricketts, 2006). However, a permanent positive residual is only 
possible when constant technical progress disrupts the stationary state. Because 
neoclassical economics has relatively little to say about technical progress, there is 
simply no room for a theory of entrepreneurship within the economic analysis 
dominated by static equilibrium under conditions of perfect competition. (Blaug, 
1986) 
Therefore, entrepreneur has been excluded, or is not given at least any central role, in 
the work of some renowned economists such as David Ricardo (1772-1823), Adam 
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Smith (1723-1790) or Karl Marx (1818-1883). (Ricketts, 2006) Whereas Smith 
viewed the entrepreneur merely as a provider of capital, another renowned British 
economist Alfred Marshall (1842-1924) complemented Smith’s idea by considering 
entrepreneur as a labor category type with some special skills (Lahti, 1986).  
It was not until the twentieth century, when Knight (1921) emphasized entrepreneur 
as a risk-bearer (Kanniainen, 2006) and highlighted the entrepreneurial element 
(Ricketts, 2006), and when perhaps the most influential economist in the economic 
literature on entrepreneurship, Schumpeter (1934, 1942), underlined the special role 
of entrepreneur as an innovator (Lahti, 1986). However, mainstream economic 
theory continued to neglect the writings of both Knight and Schumpeter because they 
did not fit in with static equilibrium analysis (Blaug, 1986). The reason for this 
neglect is not that economists would have considered entrepreneur insignificant but 
the problem was simply methodological (Bianchi & Henrekson, 2005; Henrekson, 
2007).  
However, the economic research on entrepreneurship started to take more hold in 
1970s’ when economic theorists became gradually uncomfortable about excluding 
entrepreneurship from their models. The reason for this was that entrepreneur had 
become more important in the real world, and it could not be neglected anymore. 
(Wennekers & Thurik, 1999) The first three-quarters of the last century was the era 
of so called managed economy being characterized by large enterprises and scale 
economies (Audretsch & Thurik, 2001). However, the re-emergence of small 
businesses since the mid-1970s initiated the shift from managed economy to an 
entrepreneurial economy where environment is more turbulent and firms are more 
flexible (Audretsch & Thurik, 2004). Consequently, the research paradigm was 
affected accordingly. Since the 1970s entrepreneurship has been approached in 
economics mainly from three different perspectives: (i) entrepreneur as an organizer 
of a business (e.g. Lucas, 1978), (ii) entrepreneur as a risk-bearer (e.g. Kanbur, 1979; 
Kihlström & Laffont, 1979), and (iii) entrepreneur as an innovator (e.g. Aghion et al., 
2002). (Kanniainen, 2006)  
In terms of research agenda, economic literature has studied extensively the 
determinants of entrepreneurship since the late 1980s, utilizing both longitudinal, 
time-series and cross-section data (Ilmakunnas & Kanniainen, 2001) (e.g. 
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Blanchflower, 2000; Bosma et al., 2005; Bosma, 2009; van Stel et al., 2007). For 
example, Bosma et al. (2005) distinguish broadly between economic, technological, 
demographic, social and cultural, and policy determinants.  
Also the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic development has been 
studied (e.g. van Stel et al., 2005; Wennekers et al., 2005; Wennekers & Thurik, 
1999). All of the articles mentioned above identify a U-shaped relationship between 
a country’s rate of entrepreneurial dynamics and its level of economic development. 
Furthermore, literature has studied also entry barriers to entrepreneurship, such as 
start-up costs (e.g. Fonseca et al., 2001), entry regulation (e.g. Djankov et al., 2002; 
Klapper et al., 2006; van Stel et al., 2007), and barriers caused by informational 
asymmetries such as imperfect transmission of tacit knowledge (e.g. Kanniainen and 
Poutvaara, 2007). Empirical evidence from developed countries indicates that entry 
costs and regulations tend to lower new firm formation (e.g. Fonseca et al., 2001; 
Klapper et al., 2006).  
In terms of labor market institutions, the research focus has been mostly on studying 
the impact of institutions on employment (Kanniainen & Vesala, 2005). However, 
apart from few studies of Ilmakunnas and Kanniainen (2001), Kanniainen and 
Leppämäki (2009) and Kanniainen and Vesala (2005), very little is known of the 
impact of labor market institutions on enterprise formation, or of the interaction 
between labor market institutions and entrepreneurial risk (Kanniainen & 
Leppämäki, 2009). More specifically, very little is known of the impact of labor 
unions on new firm formation. This is clearly a significant research gap, and the 
issue is also the focus of this thesis. Research on the topic may create also important 
policy implications in terms of employment, considering the notion pointed out by 
Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) that employment effects come not only from the 
internal growth of the existing firms but also from market entry of new enterprises.  
Returning back to the definitional dilemma; economists have tried to explain the 
multifaceted nature of an entrepreneur through several of roles and functions. 
Wennekers and Thurik (1999) list overall thirteen distinct roles of an entrepreneur 
that have been identified in the economic literature, ranging from roles such as “the 
owner of an enterprise”, “decision maker” and “the person who assumes the risk 
associated with uncertainty” to roles such as “the person who realizes a start-up of a 
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new business” and “an innovator”. Therefore, it is no surprise that although some 
economic models can be used to analyze some specific aspects of entrepreneurship, 
there is no single model that could capture them all (Bianchi & Henrekson, 2005).  
According to Venkataraman (1997), most of the economic researchers have defined 
an entrepreneur in terms of who he/she is or what he/she does. Shane and 
Venkataraman (2000) criticize this approach as it neglects the existence of 
opportunities; or as they put it: “to have entrepreneurship, you must first have 
entrepreneurial opportunities”. Casson (as cited in Shane and Venkataraman, 2000) 
defines entrepreneurial opportunities as situations where new goods, services, raw 
materials, and organizing methods can be introduced and sold at greater than their 
cost of production. Entrepreneurial opportunities may arise from different sources 
ranging from new product introductions or process improvements to new market 
entries (Verheul et al., 2002).  
It is also possible to distinguish between necessity entrepreneurs and opportunity 
entrepreneurs. The former is not in entrepreneurship by choice but by necessity as 
there is no wage employment available (push effect), whereas the latter refers to an 
entrepreneur who aims to exploit some perceived opportunity (pull effect). (Naudé, 
2008) Henrekson (2007) characterizes these types as second-best and first-best cases, 
respectively. Indeed, some empirical evidence suggests that the determinants for 
these two types of entrepreneurship differ from each other (e.g. van Stel et al., 2007).  
Moreover, definitional ambiguity creates also measurement problems. For example, 
some countries define self-employment differently, which makes cross-country 
comparisons difficult (Verheul et al, 2002). Although self-employment is commonly 
used measure of entrepreneurship especially by economists, it is criticized of 
including individuals who are not entrepreneurs in the “classic” sense. In other 
words, they are not necessary innovators or arbitrageurs or any other function 
associated with entrepreneurship. Also some researchers exclude self-employed 
professionals in order to obtain a “purer” measure of entrepreneurship. (Parker, 
2007)   
It is now clear that defining and measuring entrepreneurship is anything but 
straightforward. However, Naudé (2008) mentions that entrepreneur is most often 
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defined in economics either through a behavioral definition, an outcomes definition 
or an occupational definition. He explains that in terms of the behavioral definition, 
an entrepreneur can be, for example, a coordinator of production and an agent of 
change – i.e. Schumpeter’s (1934, 1942) innovator causing creative destruction – or 
someone who facilitates adjustment to change by seizing profitable opportunities 
(Kirzner, 1973). On the other hand, the outcomes definition refers to different types 
of entrepreneurs that have different impact on the economy (Naudé, 2008). Three 
types of entrepreneurs can be identified: productive, unproductive (e.g. rent-seeking), 
or destructive (e.g. illegal activities) (Baumol, 1990; Douhan & Henrekson, 2007). 
Finally, the occupational definition regards entrepreneurship as an occupational 
status; entrepreneurs are self-employed in contrast to unemployed or people in wage 
employment (Naudé, 2008).  
The above discussion of the origins and history of entrepreneurial research in 
economics is far from conclusive and it merely scratches the surface. However, it 
highlights the relative novelty of the field, at least in methodological terms, and the 
multidimensional nature of entrepreneurship, and consequently explains the lack of 
general entrepreneurial theory or model and the lack of commonly agreed definition 
for entrepreneurship. Therefore, it is no surprise that there are controversial views 
about how to define or measure entrepreneurship or how it affects economic 
development (Verheul et al., 2002). Nevertheless, the discussion also provides the 
necessary elements to delineate the definition for this thesis. 
Considering the aim of this thesis to study the impact of labor market institutions on 
enterprise formation, it is appropriate to follow mainly the occupational definition 
described earlier. Thus, entrepreneurs are considered here as persons who have made 
an occupational choice to become an entrepreneur instead of being employed or 
unemployed. Furthermore, based on the approach of Fonseca et al. (2001), the 
following distinction is made between entrepreneurs and employed workers: 
entrepreneurs create jobs and manage them, whereas workers occupy jobs to make 
them productive. This thesis follows also the Knightian tradition of entrepreneurial 
risk; meaning that the markets are functioning under uncertainty and there is no 
private or social institutions which would provide insurance against the business 
failure.  
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2.1.2. Labor	unions	as	labor	market	institutions	
According to Boeri and van Ours (2008), a labor market institution is “a system of 
laws, norms, or conventions resulting from a collective choice and providing 
constraints or incentives that alter individual choice over labor and pay”. Some of 
these institutions act on prices by setting a wedge directly between the revenues 
created from a job (ݕ) and the reservation wage (ݓ௥), i.e. the lowest wage at which 
a worker is willing to accept a job offer. These institutions thus force employers to 
pay more than the reservation wage and workers to receive less than the labor cost 
paid by employers. For example, taxes, minimum wages, labor unions and 
unemployment benefits are institutions that act primarily on prices.  
On the other hand, institutions such as regulation on working hours, immigration and 
education policies and employment protection legislation (EPL) act on quantities of 
labor being supplied or demanded, and thus set a wedge only indirectly. 
Nevertheless, both types of labor market institutions reduce the size of labor markets. 
On the other hand, they not only remedy market failures due to asymmetric 
information and externalities but also affect the income distribution and meet the 
requests of specific interest groups. (Boeri & van Ours, 2008) 
Labor unions are voluntary membership organizations that tend to pursue egalitarian 
wage policies through collective bargaining, and thus can be characterized mainly as 
institutions acting on prices. The wages can be negotiated at different levels (the 
degree of centralization), and the wage negotiation process can be also coordinated 
between collective bargaining partners (the degree of coordination). National labor 
unions bargain with governments over the minimum wage, labor laws such as EPL, 
the age of retirement, family policies, and unemployment benefits. Moreover, labor 
unions bargain over all aspects of an employment contract such as wages, working 
hours, overtime pay, and health and safety standards. They negotiate with employers 
on a collective basis, and hence overrule or complete individual contracts. Overall, 
unions interact with many other labor market institutions, also with quantity-based 
ones. (Boeri & van Ours, 2008) 
Relevance of unions is measured conventionally by union density and union 
coverage. Union density is the percentage of workers registered in some labor union, 
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whereas union coverage is the percentage of workers whose contract is regulated by 
collective agreements signed by labor unions. Principally, a worker joins a union if 
the union job offers a better wage-employment combination than the non-union job. 
Although union membership has been on decline in most industrialized countries 
since the 1980’s, unions are still important. Especially in countries with the Ghent 
System, such as in Finland, the decline started only later. The reason for this is 
associated with the fact that in Ghent-countries unions are stronger as they are 
responsible for providing the unemployment insurance system. Furthermore, the 
coverage of collective bargaining did not decline alongside the density rates. This 
suggests that simple measure of union density or membership can be quite 
misleading in terms of measuring union-strengths. (Pekkarinen, 2013)  
This thesis focuses mainly on labor unions as wage-setting institutions that interfere 
with wage-setting through bargaining. According to Boeri and van Ours (2008), the 
basic labor union theory usually characterizes the effects of unions on wages and 
employment as outcomes of a collective bargaining process between unions and 
organizations of employers. Moreover, the outcomes depend on the bargaining 
power of these two parties as well as on the scope of bargaining; i.e. whether it is 
bargained only over wages or over both wages and employment levels.  
The standard and more realistic characterization is the one in which it is bargained 
only over wages, and individual employers take wages as given. Employers, who 
have the right to manage their firms, then choose the employment level that 
maximizes the profits of the firm. On the other hand, it is assumed that a union wants 
to maximize the expected utility of the representative member in the union or the 
average utility of the union members. This expected utility is often called also as a 
union’s objective function. This characterization described above is often referred to 
as right-to-manage model. The model characterizes the bargaining process through 
Nash-bargaining; i.e. maximization problem of a product of surplus of workers and 
firms weighted by their respective bargaining strengths. (Pekkarinen, 2013)  
In addition to wage-bargaining process, this thesis considers also unemployment 
benefits and specific EPL-measures as they may have a significant impact on the 
labor market structure in terms of number of entrepreneurs and employed workers. 
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Moreover, as it was discussed earlier, labor unions may affect entrepreneurship also 
indirectly by promoting unemployment benefit system and EPL.  
Boeri and van Ours (2008) define unemployment benefits as an instrument to protect 
individuals against uninsurable labor market risk by offering replacement income to 
workers experiencing unemployment spells after having lost their job. On the other 
hand, Boeri and van Ours (2008) define EPL as a set of norms and procedures to be 
followed in case of dismissals of redundant workers. Parker (2007) defines EPL 
simply just as measures designed to protect the rights of employees at work. 
Therefore, EPL protects jobholders by making the dismissal more difficult for 
employers. EPL comprises of all types of employment protection measures used in 
practice, whereas employment protection defined by OECD in general refers to 
regulations about hiring (e.g. contractual conditions) and firing (e.g. redundancy 
procedures and severance payments) (Parker, 2007). The overall indicator for 
measuring the rigidity of EPL in a country is usually derived by taking the average of 
three different sub-measures: i) the rigidity of the firing regulations for individual 
workers under permanent contract, ii) temporary contracts, and iii) the rigidity of 
collective dismissals (Boeri & van Ours, 2008).  
2.2. Theoretical	framework	
Verheul et al. (2002) provide a theoretical framework of the determinants of 
entrepreneurship presented in Figure 4. The framework incorporates different 
disciplinary approaches, levels of analysis, a distinction between the demand and 
supply side as well as a distinction between the actual and equilibrium level of 
entrepreneurship. The basic idea is to explain the role of the government in the 
process of individual decision-making to start up a firm or incumbent firm owner to 
remain in business or to exit. 
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Figure 4: Framework of determinants of entrepreneurship (Verheul et al., 2002) 
First of all, Verheul et al. (2002) follows the characterization of Bosma et al. (1999) 
by distinguishing between demand and supply side of entrepreneurship. The demand 
side represents the product market perspective and the carrying capacity of the 
market; i.e. the opportunities available for entrepreneurship. From the consumer 
point of view, new opportunities arise from the diversity of consumer demand, 
whereas the firm point of view focuses more on the industrial structure.  On the other 
hand, the supply side represents the labor market perspective, i.e. the potential 
entrepreneurs, where the key elements of resources, individual abilities and 
preferences are influenced not only by the characteristics of the population but also 
by cultural and institutional environment. Related to the discussion earlier in this 
chapter regarding necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs, the demand and supply 
side of entrepreneurship represent the push and pull factors, respectively. 
Both the demand side opportunities and the supply side resources, abilities and 
preferences are taken into account as an individual makes his/her entrepreneurial 
decision, i.e. the occupational choice. An individual weighs alternative types of 
employment, i.e. entrepreneurship, wage-employment and unemployment, based on 
the perceived opportunities and individual characteristics. In other words, the 
occupational choice is made on the basis of the individual’s own risk-reward profile. 
According to Verheul et al. (2002), another formulation for this would be to consider 
the expected rewards of wage-employment as the opportunity costs of 
entrepreneurship. This view is captured quite well by Bosma et al. (2005) as they 
state: “…the better the prospects of entrepreneurial income as compared to the wage 
 19 
 
income of an employee, the lower the opportunity costs of entrepreneurship and the 
more people will be attracted to becoming entrepreneur”.  
However, it is often assumed that individuals do not compare only the expected 
financial rewards but also the non-pecuniary rewards of different alternatives. 
Acemoglu (1995) considers non-financial rewards of entrepreneurship such as 
autonomy or social status and prestige. Similarly, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 
(2002) consider also autonomy, or independency, as well as a preference for variety. 
In terms of risks, both the financial and non-pecuniary risks play an important role in 
the decision making as well. The importance of evaluating risks becomes obvious 
when it is considered that approximately 50% to 60% of new business start-ups 
survive the first three years of activity as concluded in Eurostat (2004). Verheul et al. 
(2002) list possible risks such as the stress caused by the loss in income, the loss of 
entitlements to social security, health care coverage, pensions and invalidity 
insurance, and high interest rates that either present foregone potential investment 
opportunities or a risk in terms of debt financing. As a consequence, the opportunity 
costs of self-employment increase, making the employment option more desirable. 
The decision may be based also on how content a person is with his or her current 
situation, or on the current cultural attitude towards different types of employment. 
According to Blanchflower and Oswald (1998), Blanchflower (2000) and 
Blanchflower (2004), the self-employed at least in OECD countries have consistently 
higher rates of job satisfaction than wage-laborers. Shapero and Sokol (1982) note 
that dissatisfaction with the current employment or unemployment situation shifts 
individual preferences towards entrepreneurship. They also refer to “negative 
displacements”, i.e. negative social events or shifts that may stimulate people to 
become an entrepreneur. On the other hand, Licht (2007) explains that also 
entrepreneurial culture that does not set social stigma to firm failure can enhance 
entrepreneurship. 
At the aggregate level, occupational choices form entry and exit rates of 
entrepreneurship. However, entry and exit rates can also affect the risk-reward 
profile through an effect known as the “demonstration effect”. It means that if the 
perceived popularity of being an entrepreneur is increased (decreased), ceteris 
paribus, more (less) people want to become an entrepreneur (Verheul et al., 2002). 
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The findings of Giannetti and Simonov (2004) support this view as they find out that 
perceived popularity of entrepreneurship improves entrepreneurial preferences in 
Sweden. 
Verheul et al. (2002) distinguish between the actual rate of entrepreneurship (E) and 
the equilibrium rate of entrepreneurship (E*). The former results from the short-term 
balance of supply and demand, whereas the latter is the long-term equilibrium rate 
determined by the state of economic development. The deviation of the actual rate 
from the equilibrium rate of entrepreneurship is captured by the “disequilibrium” (E-
E*), and it can be restored either through market forces or government intervention. 
As noted by OECD (2000), government policy intervention in the economic process 
should consider both environmental conditions as well as individual characteristics. 
This view is captured by the model of Verheul et al. (2002) as well. The policy 
interventions of the government (G) work through different channels denoted by the 
arrows (G1-G5). The policy channels, or types, are described in Table 1.    
Table 1: Five types of policy measures (based on Verheul et al., 2002) 
Policy type Description 
G1 The (de)-regulation of entry and privatization, or collectivization, 
of many services and utilities influence opportunities to start a 
business.  
G2 Immigration policy can be used to influence the supply of future 
entrepreneurs and their characteristics. 
G3 Educational policies, promotion of the availability of capital, i.e. 
the development of the venture capital market or financial support, 
and provision of information through consulting or counseling can 
influence resources and abilities. 
G4 Individual preferences can be influenced by fostering an 
entrepreneurial culture by exploiting the educational system and 
media.  
G5 Fiscal incentives, subsidies, labor market regulation and 
bankruptcy legislation co-determine the net rewards and the risks 
of the various occupational opportunities. 
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The most interesting policy type from this thesis’ point of view is the (G5). This kind 
of policy measures affect the risk-reward profile of entrepreneurship given 
opportunities, resources, abilities, personality traits and preferences. Such policy 
measures are for example taxation, social security arrangements, labor market 
legislation, and bankruptcy policy. Labor market legislation regarding hiring and 
firing determines the flexibility of the business and consequently affects the 
attractiveness to start or continue a business. (Verheul et al., 2002) Furthermore, 
according to Parker (2007), it is commonly argued that EPL harms 
disproportionately more smaller firms. 
2.3. Occupational	choice	models	
As described in the previous section, a person makes his/her occupational choice 
regarding different employment alternatives based on his/her risk-reward profile. 
Occupational choice models were developed to study this process. According to 
Kanniainen and Leppämäki (2009), the first generation of the occupational choice 
models were introduced by Kanbur (1979, 1981) and Kihlström and Laffont (1979). 
Naudé (2008) adds also Lucas (1978) into this list. Other contributors to the research 
of occupational choice models include among others Evans and Jovanovic (1989), 
Murphy et al. (1991) and Fonseca et al. (2001) (Naudé, 2008). 
To illustrate the formalization of occupational choice models, the model of Naudé 
(2008) is presented here. He generalizes from Murphy et al. (1991) that “a person 
will become an entrepreneur if profits and the non-pecuniary benefits from self-
employment exceed wage income plus additional benefits from being in wage 
employment”. In other words;  
ቀAθF൫L(A)൯ − wL(A)ቁ + η > wL(A) + ߤ , (1) 
where (η) and (ߤ) denote the non-pecuniary benefits of entrepreneurship and wage-
employment, respectively. Parameter (A) refers to a commonly available technology, 
(F(L)) to the relation between output and labor inputs, (w) to the wage rate, and 
finally (θ) to the entrepreneurial ability, which is a core element in many 
occupational choice models. (Naudé, 2008) Entrepreneurial ability reflects the idea 
that people are different in terms of their ability to produce a business idea, and to 
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elaborate and refine it into a marketable product or service (Kanniainen & Poutvaara, 
2007). 
Clearly, the basic occupational choice model described above captures the basic idea 
of the occupational choice and risk-reward profile discussed in the previous section. 
The model (1) can be also refined even further by introducing some regulatory 
aspects such as taxes (Naudé, 2008).  
2.4. Occupational	choice	model	in	unionized	economy	
2.4.1. General	structure	
This thesis follows mainly the occupational choice model of Kanniainen and Vesala 
(2005) which focuses on the allocation of individuals between entrepreneurial 
activities and entry to labor markets under uncertainty in a unionized economy.  The 
model considers labor markets with labor unions, labor protection measures in the 
form of redundancy pay, and unemployment insurance. Redundancy pay is assumed 
to be mandatory, being determined by legislation. According to Booth (1996), 
employment protection in the form of redundancy pay is socially efficient in the first-
best sense because it represents insurance for labor. Consequently, it can be stated 
that the approach of Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) merges two well-known models; 
an occupational choice model and the labor union model. The general structure of the 
model is presented in Figure 5 (Kanniainen & Vesala, 2005).  
 
Figure 5: General structure of the model as a time-line (modified from Kanniainen & Vesala, 2005) 
General assumptions of the model of Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) can be stated as 
follows. Insurance markets are imperfect and no insurance is available for 
entrepreneurs in the case of business failure. On the other hand, the redundancy pay 
(ݎ) and the unemployment compensation (ߚ) are considered as exogenous insurance 
devices for labor, and they are determined by the government prior to the first stage.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that labor is better protected than entrepreneurs.  
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In the first stage, the occupational choice takes place, determining the allocation of 
population into entrepreneurs, employed labor force and unemployed. The size of the 
population is (ܰ), and the number or fraction of people entering entrepreneurship 
and forming new enterprises is denoted by (݁). In the second stage, the wage 
bargaining between the labor union and employers’ representative takes place. The 
wage set is denoted by (ݓ). At this stage, uncertainty still remains and the cash flow 
cannot be observed. For simplicity, it assumed that there are two future states; the 
good state that occurs with the probability (ݍ), and a bad state that occurs with the 
probability (1 − ݍ). In the third stage, firms hire and train (݈) workers. Therefore, 
the “natural rate of unemployment” can be denoted by (ܰ − ݈݁ − ݁). In the fourth 
stage, uncertainty is resolved in terms of the future state, and in the fifth stage firms 
adjust their employment according to the right to manage. The model is solved by 
backward induction, starting from the last stage.  
2.4.2. Labor	demand	
Labor demand is determined in the third stage where firms must hire and train 
workers under uncertainty. Each firm’s expected profits are  
ܧ[ߨ] = ݍ[݂(݈) − ݓ݈] − (1 − ݍ)[݈ݎ]   (2) 
The only input in the model is labor (݈) for which the wage (ݓ) is paid. The good 
state occurs with the probability (ݍ), and the revenue function is then (݂(݈)). The 
bad state occurs with the probability (1 − ݍ), meaning that hired employees do not 
produce any revenue and all of them are fired. In the case of firing, the firm pays the 
firing cost (݈ݎ). After hiring and training, labor markets are closed and no further 
expansion in employment is possible. 
Labor demand in the hiring stage is derived by maximizing the firm’s expected 
profits and by assuming a revenue function: ݂(݈) = (ଵఊ)݈ఊ, 0 < ߛ < 1. Labor demand 
is thus (see the solution in Appendix A1): 
݈∗ = (ݓ + ߶ݎ)ିఋ,     (3) 
where ߶ = ଵି௤௤  and ߜ = −
ଵ
ఊିଵ > 1. 
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2.4.3. Wage	bargaining	
The wage (ݓ) is bargained in the second stage. A rational labor union anticipates the 
hiring incentive of the firms and takes it into account in its wage demand. Thus, the 
Nash bargaining problem over the wage rate (ݓ) between the labor union and 
employers’ representative can be formulated as follows: 
ߗ = (ܧ[ܸ] − ଴ܸ)ఓ(ܧ[П∗] − П଴)ଵିఓ,   (4) 
where ܧ[ܸ] is the expected utility, the objective function, of labor union and 
ܧ[П∗](= ݁ܧ[ߨ∗]) is the sum of all the optimized entrepreneurial profits in the 
economy. Parameters (ߤ) and (1 − ߤ) are relative bargaining powers of the labor 
union and the employers’ representative, respectively. The expected utility of the 
labor union is assumed to be additive with respect to the utility of hired union 
members and the utility of unemployed members, and it can be formulated as 
follows: 
 ܧ[ܸ] = ݁[ݍ݈∗ݑ(ݓ) + (1 − ݍ)݈∗ݑ(ݎ + ߚ)] + (ܰ − ݁ − ݈݁∗)ݑ(ߚ), (5) 
where workers are considered risk-averse, and thus ݑᇱ(·) > 0 and ݑᇱᇱ(·) < 0.  
Expressions ଴ܸ and П଴ in (4) are, respectively, the labor union’s utility and the sum 
of all entrepreneurial profits in the case bargaining breaks down. If the bargaining 
breaks down, no labor is hired. Therefore, the utility is based on the unemployment 
compensation alone. By assuming population size ܰ = 1, the labor union’s 
breakdown value can be written as ଴ܸ = (1 − ݁)ݑ(ߚ). Because no labor is hired, 
there is consequently no production, and thus the entrepreneurial profits’ breakdown 
value can be written as П଴ = 0. Therefore, the expressions inside the parentheses in 
(4) can be written as: 
 ܧ[ܸ] − ଴ܸ = ݈݁∗ൣݍ൫ݑ(ݓ) + ߶ݑ(ݎ + ߚ)൯ − ݑ(ߚ)൧ = ݁ܧ[ݒ] (6) 
 ܧ[П∗] − П଴ = ݁ݍ(݂(݈∗) − ݓ݈∗ − ߶݈∗ݎ) = ݁ܧ[ߨ∗]  (7) 
The Nash bargaining problem presented in (4) then takes the form: 
ߗ = (݁ܧ[ݒ])ఓ(݁ܧ[ߨ∗])ଵିఓ   (8) 
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The bargained wage can be derived by maximizing the Nash bargaining problem 
presented in (8) with respect to the wage rate (ݓ). The first-order condition of the 
bargaining problem is (see the solution in Appendix A2):  
ߤ ா[௩ೢ]ா[௩] = −(1 − ߤ)
ா[గ∗ೢ ]
ா[గ∗]     (9) 
The model can be simplified by assuming workers’ utility to be linear; ݑ(ݔ) = ݔ. 
This helps to refine the expressions in (9) as follows (see the solution in Appendix 
A2):  
Based on (6) and (7) and because linear utility, we have 
ܧ[ݒ] = ݈∗ൣݍ൫ݓ + ߶(ݎ + ߚ)൯ − ߚ൧                 (10) 
ܧ[ߨ∗] = ݍ(݂(݈∗) − ݓ݈∗ − ߶݈∗ݎ)                 (11) 
therefore also (see the solution in Appendix A2); 
 ܧ[ݒ௪] = డ௟
∗
డ௪ ൣݍ൫ݓ + ߶(ݎ + ߚ)൯ − ߚ൧ + ݈∗ݍ                (12) 
 ܧ[ߨ௪∗ ] = −ݍ݈∗                  (13) 
The wage rate can then be obtained by substituting expressions (10), (11), (12) and 
(13) into the first-order condition (9) (see the solution in Appendix A2). Kanniainen 
and Vesala (2005) formulate the solution as a proposition as follows: 
Proposition 1: “The wage arising from the Nash bargaining, and given the 
mandatory redundancy pay, is 
ݓே = (ఋିଵାఓ)ఉఋିଵ − ߶ݎ                  (14) 
Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) make following observations regarding the model and 
the obtained results so far. First of all, the bargaining wage decreases in firing cost, 
and its impact depends on the relative probability of the occurrence of firing (߶). 
Secondly, unemployment compensation (ߚ) and the relative bargaining power of 
labor union (ߤ) exert an upward pressure on the bargaining wage. These effects can 
be considered rather intuitive. However, more surprising is the following result: 
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Corollary 2: “Labor demand is immune to the firing cost.”  
Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) explain that the reason for this result, i.e. డ௟
∗
డ௥ = 0,  is 
not that the firing cost wouldn’t affect labor demand at all. In the contrary, it affects 
labor demand both directly and indirectly through the bargaining wage. However, 
these two effects offset each other completely.  
Finally, they make the following observation regarding the bargaining power of the 
labor union: 
Corollary 3: “The bargaining power of the labor union, ߤ, is strictly bounded from 
below by the redundancy pay and the unemployment compensation; i.e. ߤ ∊
[థ௥(ఋିଵ)ఉ , 1], where 0 < ߶ݎ(ߜ − 1). “ 
The lower boundary clearly follows from the assumption that the bargained wage 
(ݓே) is greater than unemployment compensation	(ߚ), and the upper boundary 
implies naturally the situation where labor unions have all the bargaining power.   
Therefore, Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) conclude that the effective union power 
increases in the redundancy pay.  
2.4.4. Occupational	choice	
The occupational choice in the first stage determines the allocation of population (ܰ) 
into entrepreneurs (݁), employed labor force (݈݁), and unemployed (ܰ − ݁ − ݈݁). 
The next task is to find out how the rate of entrepreneurship (௘ே) is affected by the 
labor union power, the redundancy pay and the unemployment compensation.  
The occupational choice is determined ex ante so that the expected utility of an agent 
as a worker and as an entrepreneur have to be of equal size. In other words: 
௘௟∗
ே ൣݍ൫ݑ(ݓே)൯ + ߶ݑ(ݎ + ߚ)൧ +
(ேି௘ି௘௟∗)
ே ݑ(ߚ) = ܧ[ݑ(ߨ∗)]           (15) 
From (15) it directly follows that the rate of entrepreneurship (௘ே) is (see the solution 
in Appendix A3): 
௘
ே =
ா[௨(గ∗)]ି௨(ఉ)
௟∗ቂ௤ቀ௨(௪ಿ)ାథ௨(௥ାఉ)ቁି௨(ఉ)ቃି௨(ఉ) ,                                                (16) 
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where ܧ[ݑ(ߨ∗)] = ݍ[ݑ(݂(݈∗) − ݓ݈∗) + ߶ݑ(−݈∗ݎ)].  
Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) elaborate this result as follows: 
Proposition 4: “The equilibrium rate of entrepreneurship is positively related to the 
expected utility from an entrepreneurial career relative to the lost value of the benefit 
when unemployed. It is negatively related to the expected utility from being hired as 
an employee relative to the value of unemployment compensation if non-hired.” 
2.4.5. Comparative	statics	
In this section, it is briefly discussed about the findings made by Kanniainen and 
Vesala (2005) about the effects of redundancy pay (ݎ), relative bargaining power of 
labor union (ߤ), unemployment compensation (ߚ), and “riskiness” of the economy 
on the rate of entrepreneurship (௘ே). Only the propositions and their implications are 
discussed here, whereas the detailed mathematical proof for propositions 5 and 6, as 
expressed by Kanniainen and Vesala (2005), can be found in Appendix B1 and 
Appendix B2, respectively.  
Proposition 5: “Increased redundancy pay leads to lower enterprise formation.” 
Interestingly, the proposition above indicates that although redundancy pay has no 
effect on the firm-level employment, as discussed earlier, it reduces total 
employment in the economy. Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) explain that redundancy 
pay has a negative effect on the new firm formation because it leads to reduced 
expected enterprise cash flow and an increased risk of economic loss. This follows 
from the observation made earlier that the greater the redundancy pay, the greater is 
the effective union power.    
Proposition 6: “An increase in the bargaining power of the labor union,	ߤ, or in the 
unemployment compensation,	ߚ , reduce entrepreneurship in the economy.” 
Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) point out that this common-sense intuition definitely 
holds if the difference between the profits in the good state and the losses in the bad 
state is not very large, and if the productivity of labor is not very high. However, they 
also note that ambiguity may arise if the bargaining power of the labor union and 
increased unemployment compensation not only raise the wage level but also 
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decrease labor demand and thus also employment. In this case, a person may want to 
become an entrepreneur as the threat of becoming unemployed increases. Therefore, 
Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) exclude the extreme cases from their model; 
abnormally high success probability, high labor productivity, or abnormal profit 
differential in the good and bad states. 
However, in this context it is good to realize that unions may actually have also a 
positive impact on entrepreneurship through unemployment. According to 
Kanniainen and Vesala (2005), the unemployment effect influences entrepreneurship 
both directly and indirectly. The direct effect means that it is less attractive to enter 
the labor market as an employee due to an increased risk of unemployment. The 
indirect effect means that entrepreneurship becomes a more probable option because 
high wages reduce the optimal size of enterprises and thus also labor demand. This 
discussion relates closely to the issue of necessity entrepreneurs (push effect) and 
opportunity entrepreneurs (pull effect) discussed in the first section of this chapter. 
Therefore, unemployment can be considered as a factor that pushes people into self-
employment or entrepreneurship due to necessity.   
Furthermore, to clarify at which level these effects take place, it is referred here to 
Verheul et al. (2002) who state that unemployment, or the risk of it, is likely to have 
a positive effect on entrepreneurship at the individual level through reduced 
opportunity costs of self-employment. However, at the macro level a high rate of 
unemployment can have a negative effect on entrepreneurship through decreased 
availability of business opportunities caused by a depressed economy. Therefore, as 
we speak of the effect of unemployment on entrepreneurship, we must be careful 
whether we study the phenomenon at the micro- or macro-level. As this thesis 
focuses on the micro-level occupational choices, it is clear that the former positive 
effect is more interesting for this study. 
The final proposition proposed by Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) relates to the effect 
of increased riskiness of the economy. More specifically, they show how an 
increased variability of the cash flow interacts with occupational choice. They 
consider this as the business risk and analyze its impact in terms of mean-preserving 
spread in firm’s revenue. By assuming the state probabilities equal (ݍ = 1 − ݍ = ଵଶ) 
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and by introducing a measure of mean-preserving spread (∆		> 0), they rewrite the 
expected profits of a firm presented in (2) as: 
ܧ[ߨ] = ݍ[݂(݈) − ݓ݈ + ∆] − (1 − ݍ)[݈ݎ + ∆]                    (17) 
From (17) it clearly follows that the introduction of mean-preserving spread does not 
affect the expected profits. However, the variance becomes greater, i.e. there is a 
greater variation in enterprise cash flow. Therefore, by introducing a mean-
preserving spread to entrepreneurial revenues, Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) 
conclude that the expected utility from becoming an entrepreneur is lowered, and 
thus lowers the rate of entrepreneurship in equilibrium. They formulate this result 
into the following proposition: 
Proposition 7:”Economies with greater variation in enterprise cash flow (having the 
same expected revenue) exhibit lower equilibrium rate of entrepreneurship than 
economies with a smaller range of revenues.” 
2.4.6. Criticism	
The model of Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) presented in this chapter has provided 
many interesting insights regarding entrepreneurship and occupational choice 
mechanism in a unionized economy. However, the model has some limitations that 
are worth mentioning. First of all, entrepreneurial ability plays no rule in the model. 
As it was concluded earlier, entrepreneurial ability is a core element in many 
occupational choice models, and it reflects the different ability of people to elaborate 
a business idea. However, Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) comment on this issue by 
noting that if the model would consider different entrepreneurial abilities across 
individuals, the equilibrium number of enterprises would be just lower so that high-
ability entrepreneurs would employ more while low-ability entrepreneurs would 
employ less workers.  
Second, employment protection is considered in the model only in terms of 
redundancy pay. Although this factor is rather smoothly integrated in the model and 
provides straightforward implications, the model itself neglects other possible forms 
of EPL measures. For example, it would be interesting to see, how a set of variables 
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reflecting the overall indicator for measuring the rigidity of EPL could be integrated 
in the model, and if this modification would change the results.   
Third, redundancy pay in the model is assumed to be mandatory, being determined 
by legislation. Because redundancy pay is exogenously given, it is not anymore an 
instrument in labor market bargaining. This has also an effect on the labor market 
equilibrium (cf. Booth, 1996; Kanniainen & Vesala, 2005). However, Kanniainen 
and Vesala (2005) justify the use of exogenous redundancy pay by noting that many 
countries determine the redundancy pay in legislation. Thus, the use of exogenous 
redundancy pay makes the model in fact more realistic.  
As discussed also earlier in this chapter, one of the underlying assumptions of wage 
bargaining is that a union wants to maximize the expected utility of the 
representative member in the union or the average utility of the union members. 
However, it is questionable if we can really expect that labor union directors would 
behave in such a perfectly altruistic way. This setting is commonly known as the 
principal-agent problem.  
It is also worth mentioning that the model does not consider any entry barriers. As it 
was discussed in the first section of this chapter, entry barriers such as start-up costs 
tend to lower new firm formation. However, from the occupational choice model 
point of view, it can be argued that the omission of entry barriers is not really a 
limitation. The reason is that entry barriers such as start-up costs are generally 
assumed to influence after the occupational choice in favor of starting an 
entrepreneurial venture has already been made (Naudé, 2008). This is rather counter-
intuitive assumption as one would expect these immediate issues to be also a concern 
when starting a business. For example, Van Stel et al. (2007) find out that it is in fact 
labour market regulation rather than entry regulations which exert stronger influence 
on the rate of entrepreneurship. They are also surprised that it is not the immediate 
priorities, i.e. entry barriers, which matter the most but instead those factors that are 
relevant once the business is already established. However, this does not necessarily 
mean that perceived entry barriers wouldn’t affect an individual’s risk-reward profile 
and thus the occupational choice.  
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In this regard, Kanniainen and Leppämäki (2009) provide an occupational choice 
model in a unionized economy that is very similar to the model of Kanniainen and 
Vesala (2005). They not only consider differing abilities across entrepreneurs but 
also introduce an agent-dependent sunk cost of entry so that more capable 
individuals face a lower sunk cost. In spite of introducing these extra features, they 
obtain very similar propositions compared to Kanniainen and Vesala (2005). 
Therefore, it seems that omitting entrepreneurial ability and entry barriers from the 
model does not have any significant effect on the propositions derived. 
Nevertheless, as it was concluded in the first section of this chapter, there is no single 
model that could capture all of the aspects of entrepreneurship – not even in terms of 
labor unions and other labor market institutions. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
the occupational choice model presented in the preceding sub-sections has provided a 
very plausible set of propositions. These propositions can be used as a foundation in 
formulating the hypotheses of this thesis. These hypotheses are discussed and 
summarized in the next section. 
2.5. Hypotheses	
Based on the propositions of the model of occupational choice, and on the discussion 
earlier in this chapter, the hypotheses of this thesis can be stated as follows:  
 Hypothesis 1: An increase in the bargaining power of the labor union leads to 
lower enterprise formation.  
 Hypothesis 2: An increase in the redundancy pay leads to lower enterprise 
formation.  
 Hypothesis 3: Stricter employment protection legislation leads to lower 
enterprise formation. 
 Hypothesis 4: An increase in the unemployment compensation leads to lower 
enterprise formation. 
 Hypothesis 5: An increase in aggregate risk leads to lower enterprise formation.  
 Hypothesis 6: Unions tend to increase unemployment. 
 Hypothesis 7: Higher unemployment leads to higher enterprise formation. 
Hypotheses 1, 2, 4 and 5 follow directly from the model propositions reviewed in the 
previous sections. Hypothesis 3 is not directly suggested by the model of Kanniainen 
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and Vesala (2005) but it is rather a generalization from the hypothesis 2. Whereas 
hypothesis 1 implies a negative overall effect of labor unions on entrepreneurship, 
labor unions may also cause a positive effect on entrepreneurship through increased 
unemployment. This positive effect is called here as the unemployment effect, and it 
is captured together by hypotheses 6 and 7. The hypothesis 6 concerns primarily the 
view that unions’ tendency to increase wages reduces labor demand and the optimal 
size of enterprises, and thus raises unemployment. In addition to this direct effect, 
unions may affect unemployment also indirectly through unemployment benefits and 
EPL that they tend to support. Finally, the hypothesis 7 captures the idea that 
unemployment can be considered as a factor that pushes people into self-employment 
or entrepreneurship due to necessity. 
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3. Reviewing	the	empirical	evidence	
This section reviews the empirical evidence how labor unions affect the rate of 
entrepreneurship through wage-setting, employment protection measures, 
unemployment compensation, and the unemployment effect. However, there are 
relatively few empirical studies that would investigate comprehensively the effect of 
labor unions on the rate of entrepreneurship. Therefore, whereas the first section of 
this chapter reviews those few studies that do, in addition to evidence regarding 
entrepreneurial risk, sub-sequent sections review evidence in terms of employment 
protection, unemployment compensation, and unemployment effect separately. The 
final section summarizes the evidence found, and estimates the tenability of the 
hypotheses based on the evidence.  
3.1. Entrepreneurship,	 unions	 and	 labor	 market	 regulation	
under	uncertainty	
The empirical study of Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) itself is the single most 
relevant empirical study that could bring evidence for the tenability of the hypotheses 
identified in the previous chapter. Therefore, it is reviewed here relatively 
thoroughly. Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) test the predictions of their occupational 
choice model by using OECD cross-country data on 19 OECD countries over the 
period 1978–1998. They make several notions regarding the approach, and which 
can be listed as follows:  
 Due to limited number of countries with available data, they include the same 
countries several times. For this reason as well as due to the interpretation of 
the rate of entrepreneurship as a long-run structural property of an economy, 
the analysis is based on a five-year interval. 
 The rate of entrepreneurship is measured as the ratio of non-agricultural 
employers and people working on their own account. Therefore, some 
caution is needed in interpreting the results because data includes not only the 
employing entrepreneurs but also self-employed. 
 The estimates are based on the OLS estimation without fixed country effects. 
 They allow a three-year lag between entrepreneurship and explanatory 
variables subject to time variation (i.e. union density, bargaining coverage, 
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union variables and unemployment rate) in order to avoid problems in terms 
of potential simultaneity and reversed causality. 
Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) formalize the econometric model of entrepreneurship 
as:	(௘ே)௜௧ = ߛ଴ + ߛଵ ଵܵ + ߛଵܮܯ௜ଵ + ߛଶ௝ܮܯ௜
௝ + ߛଷ௞ܮܯ௜௞ + ߛସ ௜ܺ௧ + ߝ௜௧,              (18) 
where (௘ே)௜௧ stands for the rate of entrepreneurship in country ݅, ݅ = 1,… ,19; ܵ stands 
for risk; ܮܯଵ is the unemployment insurance replacement rate; ܮܯ௝ is a selected 
index of employment protection with ݆ = 2,… ,5; ܮܯ௞ denotes collective bargaining 
indices with ݇ = 6,… ,9; ܺ is the set of control variables; ݐ is the time for years 1978, 
1983, 1988, 1993 and 1998; and ߝ௜௧ is the error term with following conditions 
ܧ[ߝ௜௧] = 0, ܧ[ߝ௜௧]ଶ = ݏଶ, ܧ[ߝ௜௧ߝ௜௧ିௗ] = ܧൣߝ௜௧ߝ௝௧൧ = 0. 
Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) provide more detailed explanations for the used 
variables. The rate of entrepreneurship (ቀ௘ேቁ௜) is measured as the ratio of non-
agricultural employers and people working on their own account relative to the total 
labor force. The national economic risk ( ௜ܵ) is measured by the conditional standard 
deviation of detrended log GDP. It is assumed that local within-country risks are 
perfectly correlated but there is no cross-country correlation in risks. The 
replacement ratio ܮܯ௜ଵ = ߚ measures the degree of unemployment compensation 
relative to labor income on average. The labor market regulation variables ܮܯ௝௜ = ݎ 
with ݆ = 2,… ,5 measure the strictness of country-specific EPL according to different 
summary indicators of EPL based on Nicoletti et al. (2000). The ranking order is 
ascending, meaning that the country with the least strict EPL gets the score 1, 
whereas the country with the strictest EPL scores 19.  
The labor union power variables ܮܯ௜௞ = ߙ with ݇ = 6,… ,9 measure the degree of 
so-called “corporatism”, “centralization” and “co-ordination” as follows: 
 Trade union density rate (ܮܯ௜଺) measures “corporatism”. 
 Bargaining coverage rate (ܮܯ௜଻) measures “corporatism”. 
 “Centralization” variable (ܮܯ௜଼ ) characterizes the wage-setting system. 
Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) distinguish between three levels of 
centralization: i) centralized bargaining; negotiations between peak 
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organizations which may cover the whole economy, ii) intermediate 
bargaining; negotiations between unions and employers’ associations 
which covers particular industries, and iii) decentralized bargaining; 
negotiations between unions and the management of a particular firm. The 
countries receive scores from 1 to 3 depending on the degree of 
centralization with higher scores reflecting more centralization.  
 “Co-ordination” variable (ܮܯ௜ଽ) measures the degree of consensus 
between the collective bargaining partners. Countries receive scores from 
1 to 3 depending on the degree of co-ordination with higher scores 
reflecting tighter co-ordination among unions. 
Finally, dummy variables ܺ include the Mediterranean dummy (ܯܧܦ), the US 
dummy (ܷܵܦ) and year dummies (ܻܦ1,… , ܻܦ5). Whereas (ܯܧܦ) accounts for 
differences between the industrial structures of the Mediterranean countries and the 
other countries in the data, (ܷܵܦ) accounts for the exclusion of owner-managers 
from the definition of an entrepreneur. The estimation results are shown in Table 2 
and Table 3.  
Table 2: Effect of labor market regulation on the rate of entrepreneurship (Kanniainen & Vesala, 2005) 
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Table 3: The effect of labor union and unemployment on the rate of entrepreneurship (Kanniainen & 
Vesala, 2005) 
 
As concluded by Kanniainen and Vesala (2005), the estimation results yield 
following results. First of all, the coefficient estimate of the risk variable is negative 
and statistically significant in all regression equations. The finding thus supports the 
basic theory of the negative impact of aggregate risks on entrepreneurship. In other 
words, evidence is found that an increase in aggregate risk reduces the equilibrium 
entrepreneurship. Second, the impact of unemployment compensation measured by 
the replacement variable is negative and statistically significant. Third, the 
coefficients of labor market regulation variables are all negative and statistically 
significant. Thus, support is found for that an increase in the unemployment 
compensation replacement rate or in the strictness of employment protection 
legislation leads to lower enterprise formation. Fourth, the coefficients of the labor 
union power variables are all negative. However, whereas the coefficient of the 
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bargaining coverage variable (ܮܯ଻) is highly significant, the coefficient of the union 
density variable (ܮܯ଺) is not statistically significant. This result indicates that it is 
questionable to use the rate of membership or union density as a measure of union 
power. Moreover, whereas the coefficient of the centralization variable (ܮܯ଼) is 
significant, the coefficient of the co-ordination variable (ܮܯଽ) is not. Nevertheless, 
the results indicate that union power reduces the entry of new enterprises. Finally, the 
coefficient of the unemployment rate variable (ܮܯଵ଴) is positive and statistically 
significant.  
Overall, it can be concluded that quite strong support is found for the view that 
enterprise formation is adversely affected by economic risks, unemployment 
compensation, union power and labor protection variables. Evidence is also found 
that increase in unemployment rate increases the rate of entrepreneurship.  
On the other hand, and in similar fashion to the study of Kannianen and Vesala 
(2005), Ilmakunnas and Kanniainen (2001) introduce a model of occupational choice 
in a welfare state. They test the hypotheses of the model by utilizing OECD cross-
country data on 20 OECD countries for five-year intervals (i.e. 1978, 1983, 1988 and 
1993). In the econometric model, the rate of entrepreneurship is considered as the 
dependent variable. The explanatory variables include factors that characterize a 
welfare state, such as financial aspects and inequality of income distribution among 
others. More importantly in terms of the current thesis, the explanatory variables 
include the union membership ratio and the national economic risk. Furthermore, the 
explanatory variable denoting public sector and welfare state is comprised of four 
different measures: i) the replacement, or unemployment compensation, relative to 
labor income on average (ݎ), ii) the share of total public sector expenditure in the 
total GDP (݌), iii) transfer payments as a percentage of GDP (݂), iv) and the total 
tax rate (ݐ).  
Among other results provided in Ilmakunnas and Kanniainen (2001), the most 
interesting estimation results in terms of the current thesis can be outlined as follows. 
First of all, the coefficient of the risk variables is negative and statistically significant 
in all regression equations. Therefore, it can be concluded that an increase in 
aggregate risk reduces the equilibrium entrepreneurship. Second, the coefficient of 
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the unemployment compensation (ݎ) is negative and statistically significant. Third, 
the coefficient of the union density, which was introduced into the model to measure 
the exogenous union effect on the wage rate and thereby on entrepreneurship, is 
negative with a relatively high t-value of -1.915. This is barely significant in 
statistical sense but provides nevertheless some support for the negative impact. 
Overall, Ilmakunnas and Kanniainen (2001) find evidence that economic risks affect 
the occupational choice between becoming an entrepreneur or employed, and that 
differential social insurance of entrepreneurial and labor risk is detrimental to 
entrepreneurship. They also find some evidence that the rate of entrepreneurship is 
negatively related to the union density in the economy. 
Both the articles of Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) and Ilmakunnas and Kanniainen 
(2001) have provided interesting empirical evidence on the issues under study. 
However, some caution is required in interpreting the results. The reason is that both 
studies use data that does not differentiate employing entrepreneurs from those who 
are self-employed and work only on their own account. Therefore, it is unknown to 
what extent employing entrepreneurs are being represented in the data used. This is 
clearly an issue because the occupational choice model presented in the previous 
chapter assumes that entrepreneurs also employ. Moreover, it is possible that data 
including only employing entrepreneurs yields different results.  
Another related issue is the distinction between necessity and opportunity 
entrepreneurs. As discussed in the chapter two, some empirical evidence suggests 
that the determinants for necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs differ from each 
other. Because neither of the articles mentioned above exploits data that would 
differentiate between these two types of entrepreneurs, some caution is again 
required.  
This section is concluded by noting that very little empirical evidence was found for 
this thesis about how risk affects the rate of entrepreneurship. This is surprising 
because risk is commonly assumed to affect entrepreneurship negatively – for 
intuitive reasons. In addition to the two studies reviewed above, also Parker (1996) 
finds evidence of the negative relationship as he studies the optimal balance between 
self-employment and paid employment by utilizing UK time series data from 1959 to 
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1991. He finds evidence that risk indeed reduces the equilibrium entrepreneurship in 
the long-run. 
3.2. Entrepreneurship	&	unemployment	compensation	
In addition to the evidence provided in the previous section, this section discusses 
explicitly the empirical evidence on the relationship between the rate of 
entrepreneurship and unemployment compensation.  
Torrini (2005) introduces an occupational choice model that focuses on the role of 
institutional variables in explaining the rate of entrepreneurship in its broadest sense 
(i.e. the measure includes entrepreneurs, self-employed on their own account, and 
unpaid family workers). The set of institutional variables include factors, such as the 
size of the public sector, taxation, employment protection, and unemployment 
compensation replacement rate. Torrini (2005) tests the implications of the model by 
utilizing OECD data on 25 OECD countries. Among other findings, the estimation 
results provide relatively strong evidence that there is a negative relationship 
between self-employment, or the rate of entrepreneurship, and the unemployment 
compensation replacement rate. However, the impact is concluded to be somewhat 
sensible to the model specification. Again, caution is required because Torrini (2005) 
uses data that does not differentiate between employing entrepreneurs and self-
employed nor between necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs.  
On the other hand, Hessels et al. (2007) study the relationship between social 
security benefits in the case of unemployment and illness and the rate of early-stage 
entrepreneurial activity at the country level. They exploit various data on early-stage 
entrepreneurial activity from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), whereas 
data on unemployment compensation replacement rates for 24 countries are derived 
from OECD sources. Although none of the data used differentiates between 
employing entrepreneurs and self-employed, the data distinguishes between total 
early-stage entrepreneurial activity (TEA) for necessity and opportunity 
entrepreneurs.  
The estimation results indicate that the effect of unemployment compensation 
replacement rates on entrepreneurship is negative and statistically significant. In 
order to see if the estimation results change, and thus to improve the robustness of 
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the results, Hessels et al. (2007) use several measures of entrepreneurship. In spite of 
the measure used, the coefficient remains negative and statistically significant. 
However, the impact or effect is weaker for necessity TEA compared to the other 
measures of entrepreneurship.  
Overall, Hessels et al. (2007) make following conclusions in terms of unemployment 
compensation replacement rate based on their estimation results. First, the 
replacement rate clearly affects early-stage entrepreneurship. Second, the 
replacement has a stronger effect on nascent entrepreneurship than on young 
businesses. Third, whereas the replacement rate affects the level of opportunity 
entrepreneurship, the effect is only weak on the level of necessity entrepreneurship. 
It is also noteworthy to mention that they do not find any evidence that the relative 
level of social security benefits for self-employed, compared to employees, would 
have any additional impact on entrepreneurial activity.  
The following three studies provide similar results as well. First of all, Staber and 
Bogenhold (1993) examine some institutional-political factors in explaining the rise 
of self-employment in seventeen OECD countries since the 1970s. They find out 
evidence on that generous unemployment insurance schemes have a negative impact 
on the rate of self-employment. Second, Parker and Robson (2004) investigate the 
determinants of self-employment by utilizing a panel of annual data on 12 OECD 
countries over the period 1972-1996. They also find evidence on that unemployment 
compensation replacement rates are negatively and significantly related to the rate of 
self-employment. Finally, Wennekers et al. (2005) study the relationship between the 
nascent entrepreneurship and the level of economic development and other control 
variables by utilizing GEM data for 37 countries in 2002. They find evidence that 
social security expenditures in terms of unemployment compensation have a 
significant negative effect on the rate of nascent entrepreneurship.  
Again, none of the three articles above use data that would differentiate between 
employing entrepreneurs and self-employed or between necessity and opportunity 
entrepreneurs. In addition, Hessels et al. (2007) criticize the approach of Parker and 
Robson (2004) for that they do not focus on early-stage entrepreneurial activity, and 
thus the analysis is only loosely related to occupational choice and new firm 
formation. On the other hand, Hessels et al. (2007) criticize the approach of 
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Wennekers et al. (2005) for that they include social security expenditures as a control 
variable, which can be considered quite crude measure for social security 
entitlements.  
Nevertheless, the evidence so far indicates that there is clearly a significant negative 
relationship between unemployment compensation replacement rate and the rate of 
entrepreneurship. From the articles reviewed for this thesis, only the study of Robson 
(2003) does not find any statistically significant effect for the unemployment 
compensation replacement rate on the self-employment rate. He even uses two 
different datasets as well as considers two types of measures of self-employment; 
including agricultural sector and not including it. In spite of these variations, the 
coefficient remains insignificant. On the other hand, he does not differentiate 
between employing entrepreneurs and self-employed nor between necessity and 
opportunity entrepreneurs. 
3.3. Entrepreneurship	&	employment	protection	
In addition to the evidence provided in the first section of this chapter, this section 
discusses explicitly the empirical evidence on the relationship between the rate of 
entrepreneurship and employment protection.  
The study of OECD (1999) finds evidence that summary measure of EPL has a 
positive and statistically significant effect on the rate of self-employment in OECD 
countries. However, it is good to notice that the study defines the dependent variable 
self-employment so that it includes the agricultural sector. As Robson (2003) and 
Torrini (2005) both point out, agriculture has traditionally a high self-employment 
rate, and there is no real reason to believe that the self-employment rate in this sector 
could be substantially explained by EPL. 
Robson (2003) examines the relationship between EPL and the rate of non-
agricultural self-employment in the OECD countries through two approaches. First, 
he uses panel data on an index of the overall strictness of EPL, based on the work of 
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), for thirteen OECD countries for seven five-year 
periods spanning from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s. Second, he uses the same 
data as in OECD (1999) which provides a breakdown of the incidence of EPL into 
following components; regulations relating to the protection of regular employment, 
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protection of temporary employment, and regulations governing collective 
dismissals.  
Robson (2003) confirms that raw data indicates that there is a positive relationship 
between EPL and the rate of self-employment. However, this evidence disappears as 
control variables are introduced, and particularly if country-specific fixed effects are 
allowed. In fact, the conclusion derived by Robson (2003) from the estimation results 
of the two approaches is that the findings of OECD (1999) are non-robust. In fact, 
strict EPL has – if anything – a negative effect on the rate of self-employment. 
Interestingly, by including the agricultural sector into the dependent variable of the 
rate of self-employment, Robson (2003) is able to reproduce the implications of 
OECD (1999) that strict EPL would have a positive effect on the rate of self-
employment. Therefore, it can be concluded that the definition of the rate of self-
employment bears a high significance in terms of results obtained. 
The study of Torrini (2005) that was already discussed in the previous section in 
terms of unemployment compensation replacement rate provides also estimation 
results in terms of EPL. Similarly to Robson (2003), Torrini (2005) finds that there is 
a positive relationship between EPL and the rate of self-employment in terms of raw 
data but employment protection is not significant regressor of the rate of self-
employment in a multivariate context. However, some caution is again required 
when interpreting the results because none of the studies of OECD (1999), Robson 
(2003) or Torrini (2005) differentiate between employing entrepreneurs and self-
employed nor between necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs.  
On the other hand, van Stel et al. (2007) examine the determinants of nascent 
entrepreneurship and young business entrepreneurship by estimating a two-equation 
model with data for 47 countries over the period 2000-2005. They include among 
others a category of variables called “Hiring and firing workers” taken from the 
World Bank Doing Business database. These variables reflect the flexibility of 
labour regulations in terms of the difficulty of hiring a new worker, rigidity of rules 
on expanding or contracting working hours, the non-salary costs of hiring a worker, 
and the difficulties and costs involved in dismissing a redundant worker.  
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Among other findings, the estimation results provide interesting implications in 
terms of the variable called Rigidity of Employment Index. The variable belongs to 
the category “Hiring and firing workers”, and it is a composite variable from other 
variables in the category. The variable is computed as the average of the Difficulty of 
Hiring Index, the Rigidity of Hours Index and the Difficulty of Firing Index. The 
estimation results indicate that Rigidity of Employment Index has a significant 
negative effect on the rate of nascent opportunity entrepreneurship. Van Stel et al. 
(2007) formulate this finding other way around; “…in countries where the flexibility 
of employers to hire and fire employees is higher, the various rates of 
entrepreneurship also tend to be higher.” In terms of measurement issues, van Stel et 
al. (2007) do not differentiate between employing entrepreneurs and self-employed 
but they do differentiate between necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs.  
Bosma (2009) exploits several sources of data such as OECD, Eurostat and GEM, as 
he studies the determinants of early-stage entrepreneurial activity in European 
regions by distinguishing between so called low- and high-ambition 
entrepreneurship. He finds evidence that early-stage entrepreneurial activity with no 
growth orientation can be explained largely by informal institutions such as 
perception of skills and knowledge to start a business. Moreover, national level of 
employment protection has no significant impact. However, the effect of informal 
institutions disappears when the focus is on early-stage entrepreneurial activity with 
growth orientation. Furthermore, the degree of employment protection has a 
significant negative effect on ambitious entrepreneurship in terms of employment 
growth and innovation.  
The most robust findings reviewed in this section are from Bosma (2009) who does 
not only differentiate between low- and high-ambition entrepreneurship, which 
closely resemble necessity and opportunity entrepreneurship, but also considers the 
aspect of employment. Also the findings of van Stel et al. (2007) can be considered 
rather robust, whereas the findings of OECD (1999), Robson (2003) and Torrini 
(2005) are the least robust. Therefore, it can be concluded that some evidence is 
found that strict EPL affects negatively the rate of entrepreneurship, or more 
specifically the opportunity entrepreneurship. Although some evidence indicates that 
EPL has no significant effect on the rate of entrepreneurship, these studies are based 
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on data which is questionable in terms of validity, which makes thus the findings less 
robust. 
3.4. Entrepreneurship	&	unemployment	effect	
In addition to the evidence provided in the first section of this chapter, this section 
discusses explicitly the empirical evidence on the relationship between the rate of 
entrepreneurship and unemployment effect. 
As discussed in the chapter two, labor market institutions tend to reduce the size of 
labor markets (Boeri & van Ours, 2008). For example, Nickel (1997) provides some 
empirical support for this as he studies how unemployment rate is affected by 
different labor market features by utilizing data of 20 OECD countries over the 
periods 1983-1988 and 1989-1994. He finds out that the unemployment rate tends to 
be higher in economies with generous unemployment benefits and high unionization 
when compared to economies with less generous benefits or more limited union 
power. These effects, however, become less significant when the unemployment 
benefit is accompanied with pressure on the unemployed to find jobs, e.g. by 
introducing fixed duration for the benefit, or if the high union power is offset by high 
levels of coordination.  
Furthermore, Nickel (1997) also finds out that strict EPL or general labor market 
regulation does not have serious implications for unemployment. This view is 
supported by most empirical studies which has found robust evidence that EPL 
affects unemployment inflows and outflows but not the employment and 
unemployment stocks (Boeri & van Ours, 2008). Moreover, most empirical studies 
agree that mandatory severance pay reduces employment and labor market 
participation rates significantly but does not affect total unemployment (Kanniainen 
& Vesala, 2005).  
Most empirical studies seem to support the findings of Nickel (1997) also regarding 
the effects of unionization and unemployment benefits on the unemployment rate. In 
terms of unionization, also Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) draw a similar 
conclusion that higher union power leads to higher unemployment rates. By utilizing 
a dataset of 21 OECD countries for the period 1984-1990, they find out among other 
findings that union coverage and decentralization have both a significant positive 
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effect on unemployment. On the other hand, by utilizing cross-sectional data on 20 
OECD countries, Layard et al. (2005) find out that countries with higher 
unemployment benefits and longer benefit durations tend to have higher 
unemployment rates. Also the following two papers find support for the positive 
relationship between unemployment benefits and unemployment: Scarpetta (1996) 
who analyzes the role of policy and institutional factors in determining cross-country 
variations in structural unemployment by utilizing annual data over the period 1983-
1993 for a group of OECD countries; and Bassanini and Duval (2006) who study the 
impact of policies and institutions on employment and unemployment in OECD 
countries by utilizing cross-country time-series data from 21 OECD countries over 
the period 1982-2003. 
Overall it can be concluded that labor market institutions tend to reduce the size of 
labor markets, and thus push people to unemployment or possibly further to self-
employment. More specifically, it can be concluded that a country with a high union 
power and generous unemployment benefits has a tendency to have a higher 
unemployment rate, whereas EPL does not seem to have any significant impact on 
the unemployment rate. 
The other side of the story is whether the unemployment rate affects the rate of 
entrepreneurship, i.e. do individuals choose to set up a business because there is no 
other alternative available. Indeed, most of the empirical evidence reviewed for this 
thesis seems to support the push effect view; i.e. a high unemployment rate pushes 
workers to set up a business. For example, Evans and Leighton (1989a) study the 
determinants of self-employment in the United States by utilizing March Current 
Population Surveys data spanning over the period 1968-1987. They report a positive 
relationship between self-employment and unemployment rates. Similarly, Evans 
and Leighton (1989b) study the process of selection into self-employment and the 
determinants of self-employment earnings using data from the National Longitudinal 
Surveys of Youth for 1966-1981 and the Current Population Surveys for 1968-1987. 
Again, they report a positive relationship between self-employment and 
unemployment rates. Moreover, the study of Acs et al. (1994), as cited in Robson 
(2003), and the cross-country study of Staber and Bogenhold (1993) discussed earlier 
draw similar conclusions. 
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Other empirical studies that provide evidence for the positive relationship include; 
Parker (1996) who studies the optimal balance between self-employment and paid 
employment by utilizing UK time series data from 1959 to 1991; Shuestze (2000) 
who studies the importance of macroeconomic conditions and the tax environment in 
explaining the trends in male self-employment in Canada and the United States by 
utilizing micro-level data for the period 1983-1994; Martinez-Granado (2002) who 
estimates a multiple state transition model with three possible labour market states – 
namely self-employment, employment, and unemployment – by utilizing data of the 
British Household Panel Survey; and Rissman (2003) who tests how demographic 
and economic variables influence the decision to become self-employed by utilizing 
National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth panel data for males at least 21 years old. 
Only the study of Blanchflower (2000) does not find any robust positive relationship 
between unemployment and self-employment rates. Blanchflower (2000) studies the 
determinants of self-employment by utilizing data of several OECD countries over 
years 1966-1996. He finds out that there is considerable variation across countries in 
the influence of the unemployment rate on the self-employment rate. The impact 
seems to vary both in terms of the direction and magnitude. It remains unclear why 
this discrepancy appears.   
3.5. Analyzing	the	results	
As it was discussed in the first section of the chapter two, defining and measuring 
entrepreneurship is anything but straightforward. Because some countries define 
entrepreneurship differently, it is difficult to make any cross-country comparisons. 
Luckily GEM has provided TEA-based data since the beginning of the millennium. 
This data is consistent across countries, and hence improves significantly the quality 
of cross-country comparisons. Also some of the articles reviewed in the previous 
sections utilize this data as well. However, this does not remove all the problems of 
comparing findings in different studies. This problematic issue has emerged also 
during this thesis; empirical literature reviewed for this thesis utilizes different types 
of entrepreneurial data which makes it hard to make any robust conclusions. 
Furthermore, many of the studies reviewed in the previous sections do not 
differentiate between employing entrepreneurs and self-employed nor between 
necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs. This is clearly a limitation because these 
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different types of entrepreneurs may react differently to different factors. It was also 
seen that many results are dependent on the model specification.  
The list of articles reviewed in the previous sections, and whether they provide 
support for the hypotheses or not are listed in the Table 4. Although some of the 
hypotheses receive less support than others, either due to lack of empirical studies of 
that specific issue or due to opposing results, it can be concluded that empirical 
evidence provides relatively strong support for all of the hypotheses.  
Table 4: Summary of empirical evidence 
Article H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 
Kanniainen & Vesala (2005) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes 
Ilmakunnas & Kanniainen (2001) Yes (weak) - - Yes Yes - - 
Torrini (2005) - - No Yes - - - 
Robson (2003) - - Yes (weak) No - - - 
Hessels et al. (2007) - - - Yes - - - 
Staber and Bogenhold (1993) - - - Yes - - Yes 
Parker and Robson (2004) - - - Yes - - - 
Wennekers et al. (2005) - - - Yes - - - 
OECD (1999) - - No - - - - 
van Stel et al. (2007) - - Yes - - - - 
Bosma (2009) - - Yes - - - - 
Nickel (1997) - - - - - Yes - 
Di Tella & MacCulloch (2005) - - - - - Yes - 
Layard et al. (2005) - - - - - Yes (indirectly) - 
Scarpetta (1996) - - - - - Yes (indirectly) - 
Bassanini & Duval (2006) - - - - - Yes (indirectly) - 
Evans & Leighton (1989a) - - - - - - Yes 
Evans & Leighton (1989b) - - - - - - Yes 
Acs et al. (1994) - - - - - - Yes 
Parker (1996) - - - - Yes - Yes 
Shuestze (2000) - - - - - - Yes 
Martinez-Granado (2002) - - - - - - Yes 
Rissman (2003) - - - - - - Yes 
Blanchflower (2000) - - - - - - No 
 
First of all, support was found for the hypothesis (H1) that an increase in the 
bargaining power of the labor union leads to lower enterprise formation. However, 
the results seem to confirm the discussion in the chapter two that the rate of 
membership, the union density, should not be used as a measure of union power. 
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Instead, union bargaining coverage is more appropriate measure for this. Second, 
some support was found for the hypothesis (H2) that an increase in the redundancy 
pay leads to lower enterprise formation.  
Third, relatively strong support was found for the hypothesis (H3) that stricter EPL 
leads to lower enterprise formation. Although OECD (1999) implies that the effect 
would be in fact the opposite, the study utilizes self-employment including 
agriculture, which is quite questionable. In this regard, Robson (2003) shows that the 
findings of OECD (1999) are non-robust; the effect is in fact negative – if anything. 
Finally, Torrini (2005) finds the effect to be insignificant. Therefore, these three 
articles do not provide strong support for the hypothesis. However, these articles 
have common limitations; they do not differentiate between employing entrepreneurs 
and self-employed nor between necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs. The study 
of van Stel et al. (2007) and especially the study of Bosma (2009) imply that this 
distinction really matters. Evidence is found that EPL has an insignificant effect on 
necessity entrepreneurship but it affects negatively opportunity entrepreneurship in 
terms of employment growth and innovation.  
Fourth, strong support was found for the hypothesis (H4) that an increase in the 
unemployment compensation leads to lower enterprise formation. Fifth, some 
support was found for the hypothesis (H5) that an increase in risk leads to lower 
enterprise formation. 
Hypotheses (H6) and (H7) capture together the unemployment effect; unions and 
labor market institutions may induce higher unemployment which may have a 
positive effect on new firm formation. Evidence was found that a country with a high 
union power and generous unemployment benefits has a tendency to have a higher 
unemployment rate, whereas EPL does not seem to have any significant impact on 
the unemployment rate. Stronger evidence was found for the hypothesis (H7); most 
of the empirical evidence reviewed for this thesis seems to support the push effect 
view; i.e. a high unemployment rate pushes workers to set up a business. Although 
the unemployment effect is increasing probably more necessity entrepreneurs, in 
form of self-employment, than opportunity entrepreneurs, the latter possibility cannot 
be ruled out either. Moreover, this positive effect operates at the micro-level, 
whereas at the macro-level the effect is argued to be in fact the opposite.  
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4. Discussion	
The previous chapter reviewed the existing empirical literature to find out whether 
proposed hypotheses of this thesis receive any empirical support. Although some of 
the hypotheses received less support than others, either due to lack of empirical 
studies of that specific issue or due to some opposing or ambiguous results, it was 
concluded that empirical evidence provided relatively strong support for all of the 
hypotheses. This chapter summarizes and discusses the results more thoroughly and 
tries to explain the underlying mechanisms for the observed patterns.  
First of all, it was found out that an increase in the bargaining power of the labor 
union leads to lower enterprise formation (H1). However, support was found for the 
view that the rate of membership, the union density, should not be used as a measure 
of union power but instead union bargaining coverage. Nevertheless, the relative 
bargaining power of labor union exerts an upward pressure on the bargaining wage. 
Respectively, higher bargaining wage increases the opportunity cost of 
entrepreneurship and hence less people will be attracted to becoming an 
entrepreneur. Furthermore, there is evidence that wages are consistently higher at 
larger employers (Oi & Idson, 1999). Therefore, it can be expected that institutional 
pressures for wage compression are likely to disadvantage smaller entrepreneurial 
companies. (Henrekson, 2007)  
As it was discussed in the chapter two, wages can be negotiated at different levels 
(the degree of centralization), and the wage negotiation process can be also 
coordinated between collective bargaining partners (the degree of coordination). As 
an additional finding, it was found out that the degree of centralization has a 
significant negative effect on new firm formation, whereas the degree of 
coordination didn’t have any significant effect.  
Second, it was found out that stricter regulation in terms of redundancy pay or in 
terms of EPL-measures in general leads to lower enterprise formation (H2 and H3). 
The reason for this, as predicted by the chosen occupational choice model, is that 
redundancy pay increases the effective union power. As above, increased union 
power leads correspondingly to higher bargaining wage and to lower rate of 
entrepreneurship. However, this negative effect of EPL on the rate of 
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entrepreneurship applies only to the “real” entrepreneurship with ambition for 
growth, whereas on self-employment, or on necessity entrepreneurship, EPL has no 
effect. 
According to Parker (2007), EPL affects especially entrepreneurial firms because 
they are often least capable of dealing with the hiring and firing costs imposed by 
EPL. Moreover, he concludes that the negative effect caused by retaining poor 
performers is likely to be proportionately greater in small firms than in large firms 
because it can expected that in smaller firms “every job counts”.  
However, there may be more to it than just pure financial issues. As Henrekson 
(2007) points out, the degree of labor market regulation and wage-setting are 
expected to influence the incentives for entrepreneurship also because they restrict 
the freedom of contracting. As a result, they limit the possible combinations of 
factors of production. Moreover, it can be expected that employment flexibility is 
especially important for small companies (Verheul et al., 2002) because large 
companies provide often better promotion opportunities and higher salaries for the 
same activities (Brown et al., 1990 as cited in Verheul et al., 2002).  
Henrekson (2007) highlights at least two other reasons why strict employment 
security provisions and other regulations that restrict contracting flexibility are more 
harmful for smaller and more entrepreneurial employers. First, efficient matching of 
heterogeneous workers to a variety of tasks and positions is more limited in a smaller 
company due to narrower scope of tasks available. In other words, as an employer 
learns the abilities of an employee, the optimal job assignment is expected to change. 
However, in a small company the reassigning is more difficult as there are less likely 
any better-suiting positions available. This observation is closely related to the 
second issue that both the rate at which workers separate from jobs and the rate at 
which employers destroy job positions decline with the size, age and capital intensity 
of the employer (Brown & Medoff, 1989; Davis & Haltiwanger, 1999). Therefore, 
Henrekson (2007) concludes that these patterns in worker separation and job 
destruction rates imply that younger, smaller and less capital-intensive employers are 
more likely to be affected by regulations that restrict the freedom of contracting.  
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Aligned with the previous view, Verheul et al. (2002) add that stricter regulation on 
hiring and firing flexibility increases the risks of entrepreneurs as it becomes more 
difficult for them to adjust their workforce in correspondence with market 
fluctuations. On the other hand, van Stel et al. (2007) provide two explanations why 
higher flexibility in terms of hiring and firing lead to higher rate of entrepreneurship. 
First, employees themselves may establish a new venture more likely when they feel 
that their paid job is less safe. Second, entrepreneurs experience increased flexibility 
in running their businesses which makes business ownership more attractive option.  
The third main finding of this thesis concerns the role of unemployment benefits. It 
was found out that an increase in the unemployment compensation leads to lower 
enterprise formation (H4). However, the unemployment replacement rate was found 
to have a stronger effect on nascent entrepreneurship than on young businesses. 
Hessels et al. (2007) explain the reason to be that considerations regarding 
unemployment compensation and social security are more relevant in the earliest 
stages of starting a new company. Furthermore, it was also found out that the effect 
of unemployment benefit is stronger on the level of opportunity entrepreneurship. 
Nevertheless, the reason for the negative relationship is that unemployment benefit 
exerts an upward pressure on the bargaining wage, which leads to lower rate of 
entrepreneurship because the increased wage increases the opportunity cost of 
entrepreneurship. Moreover, Robson (2003) points out that because entrepreneurs are 
often not entitled to same benefits as employees, employed workers may be 
discouraged from leaving paid employment to avoid losing entitlement to 
unemployment benefits. Unemployment benefits may also discourage unemployed to 
start or restart their career as an employee or as an entrepreneur. According to Bosma 
et al. (2005) (as cited in Hessels et al., 2007), generous unemployment benefit 
schemes may reflect a lower “urgency” for the unemployed to engage in 
entrepreneurial activity.  
The fourth finding of this thesis concerns the entrepreneurial risk. It was found out 
that an increase in aggregate risk leads to lower enterprise formation (H5). These 
risks may include issues such as the stress caused by the loss in income, the loss of 
entitlements to social security, health care coverage, pensions and invalidity 
insurance, and high interest rates that either present foregone potential investment 
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opportunities or a risk in terms of debt financing (Verheul et al., 2002). As a 
consequence, the opportunity costs of entrepreneurship increase, making the 
employment option more desirable. Even though the level of risk would increase 
similarly for both entrepreneurs and employed workers, the impact would be greater 
for entrepreneurs because labor is usually better protected. 
The fifth finding of this thesis concerns the unemployment effect. On the one hand, it 
was found out that unions’ tendency to increase wages reduces labor demand and the 
optimal size of enterprises, and thus raises unemployment (H6). Evidence was found 
that a country with a high union power and generous unemployment benefits has a 
tendency to have a higher unemployment rate, whereas EPL does not seem to have 
any significant impact on the unemployment rate.  
On the other hand, it was found out that higher unemployment leads to higher 
enterprise formation (H7). According to Kanniainen and Vesala (2005), the 
unemployment effect influences entrepreneurship both directly and indirectly. The 
direct effect means that it is less attractive to enter the labor market as an employee 
due to an increased risk of unemployment. The indirect effect means that 
entrepreneurship becomes a more probable option because high wages reduce the 
optimal size of enterprises and thus also labor demand. Therefore, unemployment 
can be considered as a factor that pushes people into self-employment or 
entrepreneurship due to necessity. Although the unemployment effect is increasing 
probably more necessity entrepreneurs, in form of self-employment, than opportunity 
entrepreneurs, the latter possibility cannot be ruled out either. To conclude, unions 
seem to both decrease and increase the rate of entrepreneurship. However, the effect 
of unions and labor market regulation decreasing the rate of entrepreneurship seems 
to dominate the unemployment effect. 
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5. Conclusions	
This chapter concludes the thesis by summarizing the aim, objectives and relevant 
findings of this thesis. Thereafter, the most significant limitations of this thesis are 
listed. Finally, it is also discussed about recommendations for future research and 
policy implications.  
5.1. Summary	
The research problem of this thesis was to understand how labor unions affect the 
rate of entrepreneurship, either through wage-setting or through unemployment 
benefits and employment protection legislation. Entrepreneurs were defined for this 
thesis as individuals who create jobs and manage them; they have thus an ambition 
for growth. This distinction was made in order to differentiate between “real” 
opportunity entrepreneurs and self-employed necessity entrepreneurs.  In order to 
address the research question, four objectives were set. 
During this thesis, all of the objectives have been accomplished. First of all, a 
theoretical analysis framework was presented that integrates relevant theories and 
frameworks of the existing entrepreneurial economic literature. This framework 
helps to understand the setting where an individual makes his or her occupational 
choice to become an entrepreneur based on his or her own risk-reward profile. 
Second, an occupational choice model in a unionized economy was presented which 
captures the mechanism through which labor unions affect the occupational choice of 
an individual. Third, it was evaluated whether empirical literature provides any 
support for the hypotheses proposed by the chosen model. Finally, the results were 
analyzed and discussed.    
The main findings of this thesis were already discussed in the previous chapter but 
the research question can be answered shortly as follows. Unions both decrease and 
increase the rate of entrepreneurship. On the one hand, their tendency to increase 
wages, the impact of which is increasing in their relative bargaining power and in 
unemployment benefits they often provide, leads to lower rate of entrepreneurship 
because the increased wage increases the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship. 
However, support was found for the view that the rate of membership, the union 
density, should not be used as a measure of union power but instead union bargaining 
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coverage. Moreover, EPL decreases “real” opportunity entrepreneurs because they 
are often least capable of dealing with the hiring and firing costs imposed by EPL, 
and because EPL restricts the freedom of contracting which is considered to be 
especially important for smaller entrepreneurial firms. On the other hand, unions may 
also increase entrepreneurship through so called unemployment effect. Unions’ 
tendency to increase wages reduces labor demand and the optimal size of enterprises, 
and thus raises unemployment. This effect is further amplified by higher 
unemployment benefits. Moreover, unemployment can be considered as a factor that 
pushes people into self-employment or entrepreneurship due to necessity. However, 
the effect of unions and labor market regulation decreasing the rate of 
entrepreneurship seems to dominate the unemployment effect. 
5.2. Limitations	and	implications	
There are clearly some limitations that are worth discussing. First of all, this thesis 
has focused on the rate of entrepreneurship. Therefore, the discussion has been 
mainly on the quantity of entrepreneurs whereas the quality of entrepreneurs has 
received only little attention. As it was implied in the chapter two, more 
entrepreneurs is not always better. This would be clearly an interesting avenue for 
further research; do unions affect the quality and composition of entrepreneurs.  
Moreover, this thesis has also focused only on the effects that unions may have either 
through wage-setting, unemployment benefits or EPL. However, unions may affect 
entrepreneurship also through other labor market institutions such as minimum 
wages, other specific labor laws, and policies regarding retirement and families. 
None of these issues were studied in this thesis, and may be thus an interesting 
extension for future research.  
Furthermore, as it was discussed throughout the thesis, defining and measuring 
entrepreneurship is anything but straightforward. Because some countries define 
entrepreneurship differently, it is difficult to make cross-country comparisons. 
Moreover, empirical literature reviewed for this thesis utilizes different types of 
entrepreneurial data which makes it hard to make robust conclusions. Furthermore, 
many of the studies reviewed in this thesis do not differentiate between employing 
entrepreneurs and self-employed nor between necessity and opportunity 
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entrepreneurs. This is clearly a limitation because these different types of 
entrepreneurs may react differently to different factors. It was also seen that many 
results are dependent on the model specification. Despite of these data issues, most 
of the empirical evidence seems to point to the same direction, and thus the 
conclusions drawn in this thesis can be considered quite robust. Luckily, the data 
quality and consistency have improved significantly since the beginning of the 
millennium, which allows future research to exploit this opportunity to deepen 
further our knowledge of entrepreneurship. 
Also the degree of centralization and coordination of the bargaining process received 
only little attention in this thesis. Although some evidence was found also during this 
thesis, clearly more would be required in order to draw robust conclusions. 
Therefore, future studies could find more evidence on how the degree of 
centralization or coordination affects new firm formation.  
Finally, as discussed already in the first two chapters of this thesis, entrepreneurial 
activity depends also on the level of economic development. One interesting question 
that future research could examine is whether the conclusions drawn in this thesis 
apply always regardless of the stage of development of a country, or is the impact 
different in different stages of development.  
The policy implication of this thesis is rather clear: the rate of entrepreneurship can 
be increased by lowering the labor market regulation and making entrepreneurship 
less risky. More specifically, entrepreneurship can be promoted by making hiring and 
firing more flexible, i.e. less strict, and by lowering unemployment benefits. Also the 
role of unions must be reconsidered as they have a negative impact on 
entrepreneurship.  However, it may be that these regulations are in place for a reason, 
and thus this policy implication needs to be analyzed in the given institutional 
context. The findings of this thesis are especially relevant to Ghent-countries but the 
results bear significance for other developed non-Ghent -countries as well.  
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7. Appendix	
A. Solutions	related	to	occupational	choice	model	in	unionized	economy	
1. Labor	demand	
This solution is not directly from Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) but instead derived 
by the author of this thesis. Therefore, the solution might be slightly different from 
the solution derived by the authors in the original article, although the end result is 
the same. Labor demand in the hiring stage is derived by maximizing the firm’s 
expected profits with respect to (݈) and assuming a revenue function:	݂(݈) =
(ଵఊ)݈ఊ,	0 < ߛ < 1.  
 Expected profits of a firm are: ܧ[ߨ] = ݍ[݂(݈) − ݓ݈] − (1 − ݍ)[݈ݎ]  
First-order condition: ݍ݂′(݈) − ݍݓ − (1 − ݍ)ݎ = 0  
 ↔ ݂′(݈) = ݓ + ଵି௤௤ ݎ = ݓ + ߶ݎ, ߶ =
ଵି௤
௤   (A1) 
 Revenue function: ݂(݈) = ቀଵఊቁ ݈ఊ 
First-order condition: ݂′(݈) = ݈ఊିଵ = 0  (A2) 
 Labor demand is derived by combining (A1) and (A2):  
݈ఊିଵ = ݓ + ߶ݎ  
Labor demand is thus: 	
݈∗ = (ݓ + ߶ݎ)
భ
ംషభ = (ݓ + ߶ݎ)ିఋ,	  (A3) 
where ߜ = − ଵఊିଵ	and ߶ =
ଵି௤
௤ . 
2. Wage	bargaining	
This solution is not directly from Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) but instead derived 
by the author of this thesis. Therefore, the solution might be slightly different from 
the solution derived by the authors in the original article, although the end result is 
the same. The bargained wage can be derived by maximizing the Nash bargaining 
problem with respect to the wage rate (ݓ). In other words; 
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max௪ ߗ = (݁ܧ[ݒ])ఓ(݁ܧ[ߨ∗])ଵିఓ  (A4) 
 First-order condition: 
 ߤ(݁ܧ[ݒ])ఓିଵܧ[ݒ௪](݁ܧ[ߨ∗])ଵିఓ + (݁ܧ[ݒ])ఓ(1 − ߤ)(݁ܧ[ߨ∗])ିఓܧ[ߨ௪∗ ] = 0 
↔ ߤ ா[௩ೢ]௘ா[௩] ݁ܧ[ߨ∗] = −(1 − ߤ)ܧ[ߨ௪∗ ] 
↔ ߤ ா[௩ೢ]ா[௩] = −(1 − ߤ)
ா[గ∗ೢ ]
ா[గ∗]   (A5) 
 Expressions in (A5): 
ܧ[ݒ௪]	can be expressed directly as  
ܧ[ݒ௪] = డ௟
∗
డ௪ ൣݍ൫ݓ + ߶(ݎ + ߚ)൯ − ߚ൧ + ݈∗ݍ  (A6) 
Deriving ܧ[ߨ௪] is trickier. First listing here some additional help; 
o Labor demand: ݈∗ = (ݓ + ߶ݎ)
భ
ംషభ 
 FOC: డ௟
∗
డ௪ =
ଵ
ఊିଵ (ݓ + ߶ݎ)
భ
ംషభିଵ = ଵఊିଵ
௟∗
௟∗ംషభ (A7) 
o Revenue function: ݂(݈∗) = ቀଵఊቁ ݈∗
ఊ 
 FOC: డ௙(௟
∗)
డ௪ =
డ௙(௟∗)
డ௟∗
డ௟∗
డ௪ = ݈∗
ఊିଵ ଵ
ఊିଵ
௟∗
௟∗ംషభ =
ଵ
ఊିଵ ݈∗  (A8) 
Thus, now  
ܧ[ߨ௪] = ݍ ቂడ௙(௟
∗)
డ௪ −
డ(௪௟∗)
డ௪ − ߶ݎ
డ௟∗
డ௪ቃ = ݍ[
ଵ
ఊିଵ ݈∗ − ݈∗ − ݓ
డ௟∗
డ௪ − ߶ݎ
డ௟∗
డ௪]    (A9) 
From (A7) it is known that ଵఊିଵ = ݈∗
ఊିଶ డ௟∗
డ௪, and therefore the expression above can 
be written as:  
ܧ[ߨ௪] = ݍൣ(݈∗ఊିଵ − ݓ − 	߶ݎ൯ డ௟
∗
డ௪ − ݈∗] = −ݍ݈∗ (A10) 
Consequently, (A5) can now be written as follows: 
ߤ
ങ೗∗
ങೢൣ௤൫௪ାథ(௥ାఉ)൯ିఉ൧ା௟∗௤	
௟∗ൣ௤൫௪ାథ(௥ାఉ)൯ିఉ൧ = −(1 − ߤ)
ି௤௟∗
௤(௙(௟∗)ି௪௟∗ିథ௟∗௥)         (A11) 
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The (A11) can be solved for the bargained wage by noticing first that 
݈∗ = (ݓ + ߶ݎ)
భ
ംషభ = (ݓ + ߶ݎ)ିఋ,	where ߜ = − ଵఊିଵ	and ߶ =
ଵି௤
௤ ; and thus 
డ௟∗
డ௪ =
−ߜ(ݓ + ߶ݎ)ିఋିଵ; and additionally that ݂(݈∗) = ቀଵఊቁ ݈∗
ఊ = ఋఋିଵ (ݓ + ߶ݎ)ଵିఋ. 
The (A11) can be expressed therefore as: 
ߤ ିఋ(௪ାథ௥)షഃషభൣ௤൫௪ାథ(௥ାఉ)൯ିఉ൧ା(௪ାథ௥)షഃ௤	(௪ାథ௥)షഃൣ௤൫௪ାథ(௥ାఉ)൯ିఉ൧ = −(1 − ߤ)
ି௤(௪ାథ௥)షഃ
௤ቀ( ഃഃషభିଵ)(௪ାథ௥)భషഃቁ
       (A12) 
The bargained wage can then be derived from (A12) as follows: 
ߤ−ߜ(ݓ + ߶ݎ)
ିଵൣݍ൫ݓ + ߶(ݎ + ߚ)൯ − ߚ൧ + ݍ	
ൣݍ൫ݓ + ߶(ݎ + ߚ)൯ − ߚ൧ = (1 − ߤ)
(ߜ − 1)
(ݓ + ߶ݎ) 
↔  −ߜߤൣݍ൫ݓ + ߶(ݎ + ߚ)൯ − ߚ൧ + ߤ(ݓ + ߶ݎ)ݍ = (ߜ − 1 − ߜߤ + ߤ)ൣݍ൫ݓ + ߶(ݎ + ߚ)൯ − ߚ൧ 
↔  ߤ(ݓ + ߶ݎ)ݍ = (ߜ − 1 + ߤ)ൣݍ൫ݓ + ߶(ݎ + ߚ)൯ − ߚ൧ 
↔ ߤ(1 − ݍ)ݎ = (ߜ − 1)ݍݓ + (ߜ − 1)(1 − ݍ)ݎ + ߤ(1 − ݍ)ݎ + (ߜ − 1 + ߤ)ߚ − (ߜ − 1 + ߤ)ߚݍ − (ߜ − 1 + ߤ)ߚ 
↔ ݓ = (ఋିଵାఓ)ఉ௤ି(ఋିଵ)(ଵି௤)௥(ఋିଵ)௤  
↔ ݓே = (ఋିଵାఓ)ఉఋିଵ − ߶ݎ   (A13) 
3. Occupational	choice	
This solution is not directly from Kanniainen and Vesala (2005) but instead derived 
by the author of this thesis. Therefore, the solution might be slightly different from 
the solution derived by the authors in the original article, although the end result is 
the same. The occupational choice is determined ex ante so that the expected utility 
of an agent as a worker and as an entrepreneur have to be of equal size. In other 
words; 
௘௟∗
ே ൣݍ൫ݑ(ݓே)൯ + ߶ݑ(ݎ + ߚ)൧ +
(ேି௘ି௘௟∗)
ே ݑ(ߚ) = ܧ[ݑ(ߨ∗)]         (A14)  
↔ ௘௟∗ே ൣݍ൫ݑ(ݓே)൯ + ߶ݑ(ݎ + ߚ)൧ + (1 −
௘
ே −
௘
ே ݈∗)ݑ(ߚ) = ܧ[ݑ(ߨ∗)]         
↔ ௘௟∗ே ൣݍ൫ݑ(ݓே)൯ + ߶ݑ(ݎ + ߚ) − ݑ(ߚ)൧ + (1 −
௘
ே)ݑ(ߚ) = ܧ[ݑ(ߨ∗)]         
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↔ ௘ே ൛݈∗ൣݍ൫ݑ(ݓே)൯ + ߶ݑ(ݎ + ߚ) − ݑ(ߚ)൧ − ݑ(ߚ)ൟ = ܧ[ݑ(ߨ∗)] − ݑ(ߚ)         
↔ ௘ே =
ா[௨(గ∗)]ି௨(ఉ)
௟∗ቂ௤ቀ௨(௪ಿ)ቁାథ௨(௥ାఉ)ି௨(ఉ)ቃି௨(ఉ)          (A15) 
B. Proofs	of	propositions	
These proofs for propositions 5 and 6 are directly from Kanniainen and Vesala 
(2005): 
1. Proof	of	proposition	5	
 
2. Proof	of	proposition	6	
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